1. "Actions, Reasons, and Causes" (1963)

[clement]

歡迎討論！


作為熱身，或者讓小弟說說一些例子。

當我們問及一些自然現象，例如「為何蘋果會掉下來？」，我們會給予一些因果關係的解釋，「因為有地心吸力，蘋果有重量，所以掉下來...」，這些是「原因」（causes），是因果關係的解釋。

但當我們問某人，為何坐出租車而不坐公車（A），他可能會解釋說：「因為我趕時間，希望準時到達某地」（B）。這個我們可以稱為「理由」（reason）。我們可以去問，「理由」可否視為一種因果關係的解釋呢？
　
換句話說，上述（B）這個理由，是否因果關係地促成（Ａ）這個行動的發生？
　



換個例子，如果那人回答說：「因為我很有錢！」（C）

那麼我們同樣地也可以問，上述（C）這個理由，是否因果關係地促成（Ａ）這個行動的發生？

但就算（Ｃ）這個理由是真，也不一定促成促成（Ａ）這個行動的發生的。那麼（Ｂ）跟（Ｃ）的異與同是什麼呢？




當我們就一個人的行動而問「Why?」的時候，其實我們問的是甚麼？


對於基督徒來說，「你為何信耶穌？」，這個問題又可以怎樣回答？
＊「因為上帝好真實的」＜但這個恆真的斷言跟「你為何信耶穌？」的關係是什麼？
＊「因為我從某一刻開始清楚相信上帝是好真實的，並且立志成為基督徒」＜這個說法可能比較好....


　

[Ming Yuen Yee]

In response to Clement's taxi-taking example above, either (B) or (C) respectively can be a reason of (A), but the reason of (A) is the one that actually caused (A).

What Davidson wants to achieve in this article (which is one of the earliest of his corpus) and elsewhere is to set out a causal theory of (intentional) action:

(1) Reason (as propositional attitude = desire + belief) can be cause
A reason for an action is the reason of the action iff it causes the action via a right kind of causal route. This reflects our commonsense intuition but becomes a legitimate philosophical topic because people following Hume rejects it.

According to Davidson:
-- agent does not cause action
-- action does not cause action
-- reason causes action


(2) Explanation of action by reason is a kind of causal explanation
Causal relation between reason and action is a kind of relation between events. Explanatory relation, however, is a kind of relation between events under descriptions.

Here Davidson has to reconcile his account with his defence of anomalism of the mental (i.e. there can be no psychological or psycho-physical laws in the strict sense of scientific, deterministic laws).

By "action" Davidson is referring to physical/ bodily actions. As for the last question raised by Clement about religious belief, I can't recall how Davidson treats causes/reasons of mental actions/states like "believing". In any case, religious belief is not (or more than) beliefs about facts. And explanation of religious belief will involve some kind of interpretation of other's (or one's own self) words and deeds, and we may have to wait until we read Davidson on radical interpretation.

[Daniel_Cheung]

(1) Reason (as propositional attitude = desire + belief)

沒有學習過 Davidson ，但看到這句，有點好奇，希望不會問得太無知。在 Davidson 眼中， reason 是一種 propositional attitude ，而 propositional attitude 是 desire + belief 嗎？但有時候，人們有 action A 時，促成 A 的只有 belief B ，而其中不涉及 desire 的吧？

例如，「有人相信遠遠望見的那動物是一隻老虎，所以逃生。」若要把 desire 放進去，很可能會是，「有人相信遠遠望見的那動物是一隻老虎，他不想死，所以逃生。」但這樣做的話， desire 只代表著 belief 產生行動的過程裡的解釋，即「為甚麼那人相信遠遠望見的那動物是一隻老虎後會逃生？因為他不想死」，而不似是那行動的成因。

[Ming Yuen Yee]

Oh, yes you are right, this is not a done deal. Davidson disagreed with most of his contemporaries.

You have led us into the technical intricacies. Belief without desire may end up as "pure intending", i.e. intention without action. Of course, "desire + belief" is still not sufficient, which is why Davidson attempts to clarify (or rather stipulate) that the proper relation between reason and action can only be causal, while admitting that there is no robust (nomological) way to spell out the causal nexus. It will all come down to what philosophical analysis ("analysis" in the strict sense of analytical philosophy) is adequate in treating concepts like intention, practical reasoning, and intentional action.

The reason why Davidson is considered the first post-analytical philosopher is that his very philosophical excellence and eminence seemed to have push analytical philosophy to its extreme and showed its limits. This will become clear later on.

For convenience of those not trained in analytical philosophy, let's take "reason = propositional attitude = desire + belief", as a definition of "reason" as used by Davidson. This will be a useful starting point. Also, it may help to loosen our idea of "desire" by understanding it as a kind of "prima facie pro-attitude".

Those who want to read more, or find it hard to digest Davidson?s concise essays (each is a mimi-masterpiece), I strongly recommend this as supplementary reading:
Simon Evnine, Donald Davidson, Polity Press, 1991.
Evnine wrote it before he got his PhD! And his first degree was in music!

[Sisyphus]

My book hasn't arrived yet ... been over a week ...

I'd like to ask a stupid question about the scope of the discussion.

When we talk about "actions, agents, events, reasons, and causes", are we restricting the discussion only to the conscious actions of a person (an agent) under a certain visible context? Does any discussion of relations of concepts fall within the scope of discussion? Is group action a concern too?

For example:

"Low socioeconomic status causes low academic performance".
"The reason of bad academic performance of minority groups is their belief that they are discriminated in educational institutes.".

Are these two statements the concern of the discussion?

[Ming Yuen Yee]

By "action" Davidson means intentional action of individual human agent.

We may as well keep in mind that Davidson is doing a philosophy of action, not psychology of action. He is not doing philosophical anthropology either. And I think some philosophers (e.g. Michael Root) totally misunderstand Davidson's enterprise by trying to cash out its relevance to the social sciences. His causal theory of theory is a philosophical account, not a scientific theory. It is an analysis of concepts like reason and action etc. into their necessary and sufficient conditions in a non-circular, non-question-begging way. If we lose sight of this, we will easily read into it too much of our own humanistic concerns.

[Daniel_Cheung]

沒有學習過 Davidson ，但看到這句，有點好奇，希望不會問得太無知。在 Davidson 眼中， reason 是一種 propositional attitude ，而 propositional attitude 是 desire + belief 嗎？但有時候，人們有 action A 時，促成 A 的只有 belief B ，而其中不涉及 desire 的吧？

例如，「有人相信遠遠望見的那動物是一隻老虎，所以逃生。」若要把 desire 放進去，很可能會是，「有人相信遠遠望見的那動物是一隻老虎，他不想死，所以逃生。」但這樣做的話， desire 只代表著 belief 產生行動的過程裡的解釋，即「為甚麼那人相信遠遠望見的那動物是一隻老虎後會逃生？因為他不想死」，而不似是那行動的成因。

開始讀這文章。有關我這問題，在第六至八頁有一些線索。例如：

Because justifying and explaining an action so often go hand in hand, we frequently indicate the primary reason for an action by making a claim which, if true, would also verify, vindicate, or support the relevant belief or attitude of the agent. 'I knew I ought to return it', 'The paper said it was going to snow', 'You stepped on my toes', all, in appropriate reason-giving contexts, perform this familiar dual function....

But to know the intention is not necessarily to know the primary reason in full detail. If James goes to church with the intention of pleasing his mother, then he must have some pro attitude toward pleasing his mother, but it needs more information to tell whether his reason is that he enjoys pleasing his mother, or thinks it right, his duty, or an obligation....

似乎 Davidson 的意思是， belief 跟那個人對世界事情會如何發生的一個認知有關，而 desire 跟他是否想那事情發生有關。例如上引文章第二段所說，那人想取悅母親，所以返教會。他知道他「返教會」會取悅母親，這是他對世界的認知的一部份。但他為甚麼想取悅母親？那就牽涉到 desire 的問題，這不是我們研究他的 belief 可以找到答案的。

Davidson 認為，要回答「他為甚麼會返教會？」，正確答案應該包括 belief 和 desire ，很多人只以 belief 來回答，若不是在那場景有足夠暗示那 desire 究竟是甚麼，就是答得不完滿。這就是他聲稱的 C1 ：

A necessary condition for primary reasons:
C1. R is a primary reason why an agent performed the action A under the description d only if R consists of a pro attitude of the agent towards actions with a certain property, and a belief of the agent that A, under the description d, has that property.

在第八至十一頁， Davidson 解釋為甚麼要把 reason (belief and desire) 視作一個行動的成因。他的論證大意是，在 someone perform action A because p. 裡，那個 because 必須跟那人的意向 intention 有關，那人是因為那個理由而做出那事。這點可見於他這個例子：

A man driving an automobile raises his arm in order to signal. His intention, to signal, explains his action, raising his arm, by redescribing it as signalling. What is the pattern that explains the action? Is it the familiar pattern of an action done for a reason? Then it does indeed explain the action, but only because it assumes the relation of reason and action that we want to analyse. Or is the pattern rather this: the man is driving, he is approaching a turn; he knows he ought to signal; he knows how to signal, by raising his arm. And now, in this context, he raises his arm. Perhaps, as Melden suggests, if all this happens, he does signal. And the explanation would then be this; if, under these conditions, a man raises his arm, then he signals. The difficulty is, of course, that this explanation does not touch the question of why he raised his arm.

Davidson 筆下的 Melden 的觀點的缺憾是， Melden 的觀點只能說明那行動可算為 signalling ，但卻沒有理會那人是否想 signal ，把 intention 略掉了。

[Daniel_Cheung]

My book hasn't arrived yet ... been over a week ...


You can read the article in the HTML file here. http://s-h-c.org/forum/forumdisplay.php?f=116

[zhengzi]

謝謝克兄、明姐的開示和張會長的整理！我讀時如墮五里霧中，不知方向，讀了諸位的帖後，開始弄清楚一點點文章談的是怎麼一回事。

[Daniel_Cheung]

這裡有個簡短介紹，或許對我們了解這些論文有幫助。
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/davidson/#Act

[clement]

My book hasn't arrived yet ... been over a week ...

I'd like to ask a stupid question about the scope of the discussion.

When we talk about "actions, agents, events, reasons, and causes", are we restricting the discussion only to the conscious actions of a person (an agent) under a certain visible context? Does any discussion of relations of concepts fall within the scope of discussion? Is group action a concern too?

For example:

"Low socioeconomic status causes low academic performance".
"The reason of bad academic performance of minority groups is their belief that they are discriminated in educational institutes.".

Are these two statements the concern of the discussion?

就如明姐所說，哲學上所談論的東西，例如認識活動，並不主要是自然科學意義上的認識活動，雖然後者跟前者有密切關係。我們一般不會把認識論直接化約為認知心理學，甚至化約為大腦神經研究（例如有一個人犯了邏輯謬誤，我們一般會歸咎為思維出錯，而不會單純地歸咎基因有病；或許我們可以幸運地找到一些statistical correlations，但在概念上把邏輯推論錯誤歸咎為神經有病，可能......不知怎說好.......可能不太妥當），雖然也有這樣主張的學派。同樣地，關於行動，有些人固然可以把它化約為一種社會心理學討論，但這也不妨礙我們對"行動"之經驗以及"行動"之概念進行哲學界定。
　

　
談論行動，自然涉及行動者（agent），而行動者既可以是個體人格，
或者是集體人格（社群，公司，團契，政府）。

談論集體行動比起談論個體行動，談論集體比起談論個體，自然來得複雜。雖然個體不能完全離開群體而獨自存在（例如作為語言的使用者，人的思維，人的行動，或多或少已經牽涉到種種社群因素、人際關係因素；打個比喻說，自然科學的觀察模式主要是 I-it的關係，是我作為主體觀察著一個客體，但在人文科學中，人跟人的互動並非只有 I-it的關係，而更多是 I-You 的關係，彼此作為主體而互動著），但談論一個單人的行動，總比談論集體的行動，來得簡單。那麼一般都是先分析一個人的行動，然後才擴展開去吧。

從結構上來看，一個實踐行動牽涉若干因素，例如知覺經驗（perception），還有價值判斷行為（value-perception），然後引發出欲求（desire），然後就用行動把所欲的狀態實現出來。例如我大熱天時看到雪糕，然後感受到「正呀！」，有所欲求希望吃掉它，然後就用付諸實踐行動。不論是個體人格，或者是集體人格，其行動都含有著相同的結構因素。
　
就如Davidson所說，我們感受到的「正呀！」，不一定是一個正式的價值判斷（即是說，for the purpose of action-analysis，不一定需要一種通過清楚反省而有意識地作出的價值判斷行為，一種瞬間的價值感受也可以）。
　
　
　
　

[Daniel_Cheung]

For example:

"Low socioeconomic status causes low academic performance".
"The reason of bad academic performance of minority groups is their belief that they are discriminated in educational institutes.".

Are these two statements the concern of the discussion?

就如明姐所說，哲學上所談論的東西，例如認識活動，並不主要是自然科學意義上的認識活動，雖然後者跟前者有密切關係。我們一般不會把認識論直接化約為認知心理學，甚至化約為大腦神經研究（例如有一個人犯了邏輯謬誤，我們一般會歸咎為思維出錯，而不會單純地歸咎基因有病；或許我們可以幸運地找到一些statistical correlations，但在概念上把邏輯推論錯誤歸咎為神經有病，可能......不知怎說好.......可能不太妥當），雖然也有這樣主張的學派。同樣地，關於行動，有些人固然可以把它化約為一種社會心理學討論，但這也不妨礙我們對"行動"之經驗以及"行動"之概念進行哲學界定。
　

　
談論行動，自然涉及行動者（agent），而行動者既可以是個體人格，
或者是集體人格（社群，公司，團契，政府）。

談論集體行動比起談論個體行動，談論集體比起談論個體，自然來得複雜。雖然個體不能完全離開群體而獨自存在（例如作為語言的使用者，人的思維，人的行動，或多或少已經牽涉到種種社群因素、人際關係因素；打個比喻說，自然科學的觀察模式主要是 I-it的關係，是我作為主體觀察著一個客體，但在人文科學中，人跟人的互動並非只有 I-it的關係，而更多是 I-You 的關係，彼此作為主體而互動著），但談論一個單人的行動，總比談論集體的行動，來得簡單。那麼一般都是先分析一個人的行動，然後才擴展開去吧。

從結構上來看，一個實踐行動牽涉若干因素，例如知覺經驗（perception），還有價值判斷行為（value-perception），然後引發出欲求（desire），然後就用行動把所欲的狀態實現出來。例如我大熱天時看到雪糕，然後感受到「正呀！」，有所欲求希望吃掉它，然後就用付諸實踐行動。不論是個體人格，或者是集體人格，其行動都含有著相同的結構因素。　
　

留意文中強調 reason as cause 是由 belief and desire 構成， Davidson 在第十二頁說，很多人把 cause 視作事件之間的關係，但 belief 和 desire 不是事件，因此以為會構成反對。但 Davidson 不同意這講法。在這裡，我們可看出， Davidson 講的，不會是關注事件與事件之間的因果那類自然科學或社會科學。因此，"Low socioeconomic status causes low academic performance" 不是他要討論的。不用談個體主體或集體主體，這已足夠。



就如Davidson所說，我們感受到的「正呀！」，不一定是一個正式的價值判斷（即是說，for the purpose of action-analysis，不一定需要一種通過清楚反省而有意識地作出的價值判斷行為，一種瞬間的價值感受也可以）。
　

此話何解？為何不是正式的價值判斷？（我未看畢全文，可能在文末有這區分。）

[clement]

此話何解？為何不是正式的價值判斷？（我未看畢全文，可能在文末有這區分。）

他在前面有提到的。他所討論的並不是一種 value judgment in a full sense，不必是長久有效的命題，瞬間感受到的都得。英美哲學說不說 "propositional or judgmental act"的？

待回我引出原文。

[Daniel_Cheung]

他在前面有提到的。他所討論的並不是一種 value judgment in a full sense，不必是長久有效的命題，瞬間感受到的都得。英美哲學說不說 "propositional or judgmental act"的？

待回我引出原文。

你說起我便有少許印象，但可惜一時間找不回來，亦不肯定他是否在說「正式的價值判斷」。

[clement]

你說起我便有少許印象，但可惜一時間找不回來，亦不肯定他是否在說「正式的價值判斷」。

請各位參看第三頁，作者用的詞語是"pro-attitude"（正面的評價態度，即我所謂的「價值感受」），然後說這不但包括長久持續的個人興趣，也包括瞬間生滅的"most passing fancy that prompts an unique action"。然後說，"pro-attitude"不等同於(value) convictions（價值確信），這就是我所說的「正式的價值判斷」(value judgment in its full sense，即作出判斷的那個人需要真心確信有關判斷 etc...)。

[Daniel_Cheung]

請各位參看第三頁，作者用的詞語是"pro-attitude"（正面的評價態度，即我所謂的「價值感受」），然後說這不但包括長久持續的個人興趣，也包括瞬間生滅的"most passing fancy that prompts an unique action"。然後說，"pro-attitude"不等同於(value) convictions（價值確信），這就是我所說的「正式的價值判斷」(value judgment in its full sense，即作出判斷的那個人需要真心確信有關判斷 etc...)。

謝謝指明出處。然而，可否稱那些

[clement]

英文的 judgment 有判斷行為（judgmental act）以及判斷（judgment）的兩種意思。同樣地，conviction也是有兩種意思。我指的不完整，固然不是指判斷的內容本身。

我之前說的 "value judgment in its full sense，即作出判斷的那個人需要真心確信有關判斷 "，比較側重主體行動的方面。



我深思熟慮看到一個蘋果然後給出一個判斷，跟我事事但但（隨隨便便）看到一個蘋果給出一個判斷，兩者的有認知意義的內容固然一樣，但那個行為本身就不一樣了。

[clement]

他在前面有提到的。他所討論的並不是一種 value judgment in a full sense，不必是長久有效的命題，瞬間感受到的都得。英美哲學說不說 "propositional or judgmental act"的？


原來是我說得匆忙不清楚，請見諒。

[clement]

Are these two statements the concern of the discussion?

對理論社會學有興趣的朋友，不妨留意一下此書：《凝視、行動與社會世界》。
http://www.kingstone.com.tw/book/book_page.asp?kmcode=2011430019751&show=content&OpenArea=1

[Sisyphus]

非常多謝各位對小弟的問題的回應, 書幾天前終於收到, 匆匆讀過文章兩三遍, 也看過會長的介紹. 坦白講, 只能以一頭霧水來形容自己的讀後感.

So, as a newbie, allow me to share what I can understand, and ask a couple more stupid questions ...

1. In the first part of the paper, Davidson clearly states that his problem is to "reformulate the claim that rationalization are causal explanations", through the structuralization of the two theses of primary reasons (p. 24). I can see that.

2. "Giving the reason why ... is often ... naming the pro attitude (a) or the related belief (b) or both; let me call this pair the primary reason ..." (p.24). Then Davidson goes ahead to state C1. Now, how can we give something a definition and then use it as an argument to support the same definition? What do I miss?

3. I am very, very interested in the question "How can my wanting (of X) is part of a primary reason, since it appears to lack the required element of generality?" (p. 25). Davidson continues to argue that " 'I wanted X' and 'I did X' are logically independent ". True. But how can logical independence of two states or events means that one is a reason of another?

4. Everything in the empirical world are logically independent. Of the everyday usage of the words "causes" and "reasons", we don't say that X and Y are logically independent and therefore X is a cause of Y !!?? I am making a newbie's guess: by saying that (pro-attitude + beliefs) causes action, is Davidson actually trying to argue that the very structure of a reason to an action must include an indispensible and subjective part of the agent, of which he calls C2, or "rationalization" in the very beginning of the paper?

I understand that every academic discipline has their unqiue understandings of words and jargons. Please excuse my choice of words. I am trying my breast.

[Daniel_Cheung]

2. "Giving the reason why ... is often ... naming the pro attitude (a) or the related belief (b) or both; let me call this pair the primary reason ..." (p.24). Then Davidson goes ahead to state C1. Now, how can we give something a definition and then use it as an argument to support the same definition? What do I miss?





Davidson 認為，要回答「他為甚麼會返教會？」，正確答案應該包括 belief 和 desire ，很多人只以 belief 來回答，若不是在那場景有足夠暗示那 desire 究竟是甚麼，就是答得不完滿。這就是他聲稱的 C1 ：

A necessary condition for primary reasons:
C1. R is a primary reason why an agent performed the action A under the description d only if R consists of a pro attitude of the agent towards actions with a certain property, and a belief of the agent that A, under the description d, has that property.

在第八至十一頁， Davidson 解釋為甚麼要把 reason (belief and desire) 視作一個行動的成因。他的論證大意是，在 someone perform action A because p. 裡，那個 because 必須跟那人的意向 intention 有關，那人是因為那個理由而做出那事。這點可見於他這個例子：

A man driving an automobile raises his arm in order to signal. His intention, to signal, explains his action, raising his arm, by redescribing it as signalling. What is the pattern that explains the action? Is it the familiar pattern of an action done for a reason? Then it does indeed explain the action, but only because it assumes the relation of reason and action that we want to analyse. Or is the pattern rather this: the man is driving, he is approaching a turn; he knows he ought to signal; he knows how to signal, by raising his arm. And now, in this context, he raises his arm. Perhaps, as Melden suggests, if all this happens, he does signal. And the explanation would then be this; if, under these conditions, a man raises his arm, then he signals. The difficulty is, of course, that this explanation does not touch the question of why he raised his arm.



他有提出論證的。讓我憑記憶講一講。他的主要論證是，在很多日常對話裡，我們其實已假定了有這兩部份，即使有些情況人們只會說出 belief 或 desire ，但再想深一層，要兩個都在構成那理由，那才顯得合理。

這方法在哲學裡叫做 reflective equilibrium （參 John Rawls 的介紹）。首先，從常識為材料找出一些概念包含的意思，然後在理論上看看要作出甚麼修改，然後在日常生活裡再找些情況來判斷是否修改得更好，不斷反覆這程序，直到一個平衡點出現為止。例如，若要定義甚麼是「色情」，我們會從現有的、廣泛認定的東西開始，然後在理論層面作出更具體描述，但我們又要回到一些日常生活例子，看看那個理論建構會否偏差了，這亦不是說生活例子一定對，有時候會是那個理論建構反過來更正我們對日常生活例子的理解。如是者不斷反覆改善，直至一個（相對的）平衡點出現。

這方法有時候會令人覺得是自說自話，因為提出定義後，好像又要用那定義來談一些新例子。但這方法本身不是這樣的。或者用另一方式說，要判斷某些概念或定義是否合理，有時候我們只能在其實際運用中才能判斷恰當，換言之，我們要從它們與其他我們已有的知識之間看出有多少融貫性 coherence 。

[Daniel_Cheung]

3. I am very, very interested in the question "How can my wanting (of X) is part of a primary reason, since it appears to lack the required element of generality?" (p. 25). Davidson continues to argue that " 'I wanted X' and 'I did X' are logically independent ". True. But how can logical independence of two states or events means that one is a reason of another?

4. Everything in the empirical world are logically independent. Of the everyday usage of the words "causes" and "reasons", we don't say that X and Y are logically independent and therefore X is a cause of Y !!?? I am making a newbie's guess: by saying that (pro-attitude + beliefs) causes action, is Davidson actually trying to argue that the very structure of a reason to an action must include an indispensible and subjective part of the agent, of which he calls C2, or "rationalization" in the very beginning of the paper?


恐怕你太著眼於 Because 'I wanted to turn on the light' and 'I turned on the light' are logically independent, the first can be used to give a reason why the second is true. 這一句，於是失卻了那幾段的重點。 Davidson 想說的是，理由有兩部份， belief 和 desire 。他首先考慮單以 desire 來解釋 I turned on the light ，所以才說兩者是邏輯上獨立的，並且 desire 是用來解釋那行動的。然而，有普遍性的欲望怎能解釋一個殊別的行動？那就要加入 belief ，當人相信在某時某刻做某事，可以 turn on the light ，而他又想 turn on the light ，那麼他就會 turn on the light 。

Because 'I wanted to turn on the light' and 'I turned on the light' are logically independent, the first can be used to give a reason why the second is true. 這句話可能是意義極小的。在那裡的意思可能只是這個：當我們為Ａ提出理由Ｂ時，Ｂ不可能是Ａ的邏輯後果，否則我們只是重覆說一遍Ａ（「為甚麼你不快樂？」，我們不會回答說「因為我在哭」或「因為我不快樂」）。那麼，Ｂ若要有資格作為Ａ的理由，Ｂ至少要是邏輯上獨立於Ａ的。這個獨立性是 necessary condition for being a reason ，卻不是 sufficient condition for being a reason ，即是說，不是凡邏輯上獨立的兩個概念都可以互相理由，但凡可以作為理由的，都會是邏輯上獨立的。

[clement]

Because 'I wanted to turn on the light' and 'I turned on the light' are logically independent, the first can be used to give a reason why the second is true. 這句話可能是意義極小的。在那裡的意思可能只是這個：當我們為Ａ提出理由Ｂ時，Ｂ不可能是Ａ的邏輯後果，否則我們只是重覆說一遍Ａ（「為甚麼你不快樂？」，我們不會回答說「因為我在哭」或「因為我不快樂」）。那麼，Ｂ若要有資格作為Ａ的理由，Ｂ至少要是邏輯上獨立於Ａ的。這個獨立性是 necessary condition for being a reason ，卻不是 sufficient condition for being a reason ，即是說，不是凡邏輯上獨立的兩個概念都可以互相理由，但凡可以作為理由的，都會是邏輯上獨立的。

對，Ａ與Ｂ兩個事態在邏輯上獨立，只是必要條件，並非充分條件；

否則的話，如果Ａ與Ｂ必須有邏輯依賴關係才能發生，甚至如果Ａ與Ｂ有邏輯依賴關係就能發生，這個世界就完全是個邏輯化、理性化的世界了，沒有任何非理性因素。
　

　
這個可以聯繫到一個古典神學的案例，雖然未必一定要談這個。我們能否在邏輯關聯的意義上說「上帝創造世界，因為（例如上帝是愛？）」。
　1. 上帝是愛　　
　2. 如果上帝是愛，上帝就必定創造世界
　3. 上帝創造世界 (1.+2.的必然結論，創造世界是上帝本性必然)

不過有中古神學家說不！上帝是可以不創世的。上帝之所以創世，不是本性必然的邏輯結果，而是因為「上帝認為創世是好的」（value-attitude），「上帝意欲創世」(desiring + decision), HE wills。這樣就大幅改造了亞里士多德的框架。
　
　
　

　

[Sisyphus]

... 他的主要論證是，在很多日常對話裡，我們其實已假定了有這兩部份，即使有些情況人們只會說出 belief 或 desire ，但再想深一層，要兩個都在構成那理由，那才顯得合理。 ...

這方法在哲學裡叫做 reflective equilibrium （參 John Rawls 的介紹）。 ... 換言之，我們要從它們與其他我們已有的知識之間看出有多少融貫性 coherence 。
那麼, 你 (Clement 和其他組員也請 jump in) 對 Davidson 這個論證所用的方法 (reflective equilibrium), 的 validity 有何意見?

或者這樣問: "action 的 sufficient condition 是否就是 desire (or pro-attitude) + belief"? Davidson 的 argument 在那裡?

我學的是 information　ｔｅｃｈｎｏｌｏｇｙ　和　educational technology. 坦白講，對　?很多日常對話裡，我們其實已假定了有這兩部份?,　我們肯定要提供足夠支持 (也甚可能是 generalized 的支持) 才可以這樣說．　當然我不是否定　reflective equilibrium，不同的　discipline　必定有自己的　methodology　的傳統．用我的 methodology 傳統去批評別的 methodology 是很 arrogant 的.

會長說得對, 這 chapter 已經 overdued, 或者我們開始下一個 chapter?

[Daniel_Cheung]

那麼, 你 (Clement 和其他組員也請 jump in) 對 Davidson 這個論證所用的方法 (reflective equilibrium), 的 validity 有何意見?

或者這樣問: "action 的 sufficient condition 是否就是 desire (or pro-attitude) + belief"? Davidson 的 argument 在那裡?

我學的是 information　ｔｅｃｈｎｏｌｏｇｙ　和　educational technology. 坦白講，對　?很多日常對話裡，我們其實已假定了有這兩部份?,　我們肯定要提供足夠支持 (也甚可能是 generalized 的支持) 才可以這樣說．　當然我不是否定　reflective equilibrium，不同的　discipline　必定有自己的　methodology　的傳統．用我的 methodology 傳統去批評別的 methodology 是很 arrogant 的.

會長說得對, 這 chapter 已經 overdued, 或者我們開始下一個 chapter?

Reflective equilibrium 是英美哲學界近五十年最常用和最有共識的一個分析方法，我會說，這其實與百多年前某些哲學家說知識的必須甚至充份條件是 coherence 沒有很大分別，也秉承了奎因對 web of beliefs 裡的 simplicity 的概念。

如此， Davidson 要證明 reason = desire + belief ，他要借助人們一些日常概念，由那裡反覆推敲。他的論證就是 partially coherent with our daily concepts and linguistic uses and partially coherent with our conceptualization 。

若要好好的欣賞這方法，有兩方面可以留意。一是 Davidson 之前的人怎樣談 reason ，二是哲學傳統裡某些只由理論建構出發而容易忽視經驗的進路。

但我不會說這是某學科的方法論傳統。某些理性思考法則，不宜分割為只屬於某個學科。


有關下一章， clement 尚未把那文章交給我，放在下載區。

[zhengzi]

I am trying my breast.

Are you making fun of 陳克勤 (http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E9%99%B3%E5%85%8B%E5%8B%A4)？

[clement]

感知（perception）、思考（thinking）又能不能視為一種行動呢？

[Daniel_Cheung]

感知（perception）、思考（thinking）又能不能視為一種行動呢？

一般來說，哲學裡這都不算是行動的，因沒有牽涉身體部份（指手腳那類）的活動。英語把這些全歸類為動詞，只是一個文法的事。正如 'there is nothing here' 裡的 'nothing' ，雖然是名詞，但不指涉任何存在之物。然而，很多人思想因此被語法所累，故有語言哲學家如羅素和奎因為這些 ontological commitment 大費周章。