sbchan
09-18-2006, 11:02 AM
AT A GLANCE: THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
Broadly speaking, the cosmological arguments try to explain why a physical world exists at all.
1. Aquinas’s Second Way
• Aquinas argues that chains of efficient or sustaining causes can’t go on to infinity. There must be a first efficient cause, which he identifies as God.
His argument against infinite chains of efficient causes is obscure. He might be confusing the denial of a first cause with removing a cause from a series; he might be illicitly applying truths about finite chains to infinite chains; or he might think there is something special about chains of causes, although he doesn’t say clearly what that would be except that he thinks they must have beginnings. The argument looks like this:
Premise #1: Some things have efficient causes.
Premise #2: Nothing can be its own efficient cause (because it would have to be prior to itself).
Premise #3: Therefore, chains of efficient causes exist.
Premise #4: A chain of efficient causes can’t go on to infinity.
Conclusion: Therefore, a first efficient cause must exist (which everyone calls God).
2. The Kalam Cosmological Argument
• This argument tries to show that actual infinite series are impossible. If so, the world had a beginning.
• The reasons are that this beginning would have to have been caused rather than uncaused and that the cause would have been personal rather than impersonal.
2.1. Finite and Infinite
• Craig argues that no actual infinite series (made up of physical objects or events) is possible.
• In the mathematical theory of infinities, two sets have the same number of things if the members can be paired one-to-one.
• This implies that the number of even numbers is the same number as the number of counting numbers.
2.2. Are Actual Infinities Absurd?
• Craig accepts the mathematical theory of infinity when applied to mathematical objects.
• Craig thinks the theory yields absurdities if applied to collections of actual objects or events.
• For example: It would imply that if we remove every other book from an infinite bookshelf, the same number of books remains.
• Problem: Craig doesn’t clearly demonstrate that such consequences are absurd.
2.3. The Rest of the Kalam Argument
• This calls for showing that the beginning of the world was caused and that the cause was personal.
• Craig insists that no “sane person” thinks otherwise.
• Problem: This is not an argument.
• Craig argues that positing a personal cause is the only way to get a satisfactory explanation. Whether this is right is difficult to say.
3. Contingency
• Some things are contingent—they didn’t have to exist.
3.1. Aquinas’s Third Way
1. Suppose that everything that exists is evanescent (comes into being and goes out of being).
2. Each evanescent thing is nonexistent at some time.
3. Therefore, if every thing were evanescent, there would have been a time when nothing existed.
4. Something can’t come from nothing.
5. Therefore, if everything were evanescent, nothing would be in existence now
6. Things are in existence now.
7. Therefore, not everything that exists is an evanescent thing.
• Aquinas’s proof depends on a fallacy. He doesn’t show that one time would exist when everything fails to exist at some time.
3.2. The Principle of Sufficient Reason
• Rowe’s version: Every thing has an explanation, and every positive fact has an explanation—an explanation that implies what it explains
• If the principle is correct, then the fact that contingent things exist has an explanation.
3.3. Is the Principle of Sufficient Reason True?
• Things like atomic decay suggest that the principle is actually false.
• It can be argued that the principle must be false
1. Let F be the conjunction of all contingent facts.
2. F is contingent.
3. Therefore, no necessary fact can explain F (or else F would not be contingent).
4. F can’t explain itself.
5. No part of F could explain F.
6. No negative fact could explain F.
7. Therefore, F has no explanation and the Principle of Sufficient Reason is false.
3.4. Does the Fact that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is False Matter?
• Quentin Smith argues that a related principle might be true:
• There is A sufficient reason for the existence of contingent things.
• This could work in two possible ways:
• God exists necessarily, and God contingently wills that contingent things exist.
• Space-time is a necessary thing and contingently fits certain quantum principles.
3.4.1. Reasons and Explanations
• Sufficient reasons might not be satisfying reasons. (Smith’s suggestion about space-time might be an example.)
• Satisfying reasons (such as the good reasons for making a certain choice) might not imply what they explain, and so might not be sufficient reasons.
• Satisfying reasons might be good enough to provide understanding.
3.5. The Principle of Satisfying Reasons
• This principle would say that there is a “satisfying” explanation for the existence of contingent things.
• This principle might not be provable.
• This principle might be reasonable to accept.
• Even if the principle is true, something other than God might provide the reason for the existence of the physical universe.
WEB RESOURCES
You can find the Five Ways online at http://www.newadvent.org/summa/100203.htm.
Leibniz enunciates the Principle of Sufficient Reason in his Monadology, which you can find online at http://philosophy.eserver.org/leibnizmonadology.txt.
There is A detailed discussion of the cosmological argument in the
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument.
Quentin Smith’s discussion of the Principle of Sufficient Reason is online at http://www.qsmithwmu.com/a_defense_of_a_principle_of_sufficient_reason.htm.
Broadly speaking, the cosmological arguments try to explain why a physical world exists at all.
1. Aquinas’s Second Way
• Aquinas argues that chains of efficient or sustaining causes can’t go on to infinity. There must be a first efficient cause, which he identifies as God.
His argument against infinite chains of efficient causes is obscure. He might be confusing the denial of a first cause with removing a cause from a series; he might be illicitly applying truths about finite chains to infinite chains; or he might think there is something special about chains of causes, although he doesn’t say clearly what that would be except that he thinks they must have beginnings. The argument looks like this:
Premise #1: Some things have efficient causes.
Premise #2: Nothing can be its own efficient cause (because it would have to be prior to itself).
Premise #3: Therefore, chains of efficient causes exist.
Premise #4: A chain of efficient causes can’t go on to infinity.
Conclusion: Therefore, a first efficient cause must exist (which everyone calls God).
2. The Kalam Cosmological Argument
• This argument tries to show that actual infinite series are impossible. If so, the world had a beginning.
• The reasons are that this beginning would have to have been caused rather than uncaused and that the cause would have been personal rather than impersonal.
2.1. Finite and Infinite
• Craig argues that no actual infinite series (made up of physical objects or events) is possible.
• In the mathematical theory of infinities, two sets have the same number of things if the members can be paired one-to-one.
• This implies that the number of even numbers is the same number as the number of counting numbers.
2.2. Are Actual Infinities Absurd?
• Craig accepts the mathematical theory of infinity when applied to mathematical objects.
• Craig thinks the theory yields absurdities if applied to collections of actual objects or events.
• For example: It would imply that if we remove every other book from an infinite bookshelf, the same number of books remains.
• Problem: Craig doesn’t clearly demonstrate that such consequences are absurd.
2.3. The Rest of the Kalam Argument
• This calls for showing that the beginning of the world was caused and that the cause was personal.
• Craig insists that no “sane person” thinks otherwise.
• Problem: This is not an argument.
• Craig argues that positing a personal cause is the only way to get a satisfactory explanation. Whether this is right is difficult to say.
3. Contingency
• Some things are contingent—they didn’t have to exist.
3.1. Aquinas’s Third Way
1. Suppose that everything that exists is evanescent (comes into being and goes out of being).
2. Each evanescent thing is nonexistent at some time.
3. Therefore, if every thing were evanescent, there would have been a time when nothing existed.
4. Something can’t come from nothing.
5. Therefore, if everything were evanescent, nothing would be in existence now
6. Things are in existence now.
7. Therefore, not everything that exists is an evanescent thing.
• Aquinas’s proof depends on a fallacy. He doesn’t show that one time would exist when everything fails to exist at some time.
3.2. The Principle of Sufficient Reason
• Rowe’s version: Every thing has an explanation, and every positive fact has an explanation—an explanation that implies what it explains
• If the principle is correct, then the fact that contingent things exist has an explanation.
3.3. Is the Principle of Sufficient Reason True?
• Things like atomic decay suggest that the principle is actually false.
• It can be argued that the principle must be false
1. Let F be the conjunction of all contingent facts.
2. F is contingent.
3. Therefore, no necessary fact can explain F (or else F would not be contingent).
4. F can’t explain itself.
5. No part of F could explain F.
6. No negative fact could explain F.
7. Therefore, F has no explanation and the Principle of Sufficient Reason is false.
3.4. Does the Fact that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is False Matter?
• Quentin Smith argues that a related principle might be true:
• There is A sufficient reason for the existence of contingent things.
• This could work in two possible ways:
• God exists necessarily, and God contingently wills that contingent things exist.
• Space-time is a necessary thing and contingently fits certain quantum principles.
3.4.1. Reasons and Explanations
• Sufficient reasons might not be satisfying reasons. (Smith’s suggestion about space-time might be an example.)
• Satisfying reasons (such as the good reasons for making a certain choice) might not imply what they explain, and so might not be sufficient reasons.
• Satisfying reasons might be good enough to provide understanding.
3.5. The Principle of Satisfying Reasons
• This principle would say that there is a “satisfying” explanation for the existence of contingent things.
• This principle might not be provable.
• This principle might be reasonable to accept.
• Even if the principle is true, something other than God might provide the reason for the existence of the physical universe.
WEB RESOURCES
You can find the Five Ways online at http://www.newadvent.org/summa/100203.htm.
Leibniz enunciates the Principle of Sufficient Reason in his Monadology, which you can find online at http://philosophy.eserver.org/leibnizmonadology.txt.
There is A detailed discussion of the cosmological argument in the
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument.
Quentin Smith’s discussion of the Principle of Sufficient Reason is online at http://www.qsmithwmu.com/a_defense_of_a_principle_of_sufficient_reason.htm.