The Problem of Evil

[sbchan]

今次的大綱有圖表，沒法post在這裡了。

不過教書的powerpoint已經上網︳可以到這裡看 (其實其他講課都已經上網了，不用password的，都可以看)

http://brindedcow.umd.edu/236/
http://brindedcow.umd.edu/236/The_Argument_From_Evil.mht

[Ming Yuen Yee]

Many thanks for sharing with us your teaching materials. The powerpoint is eminently clear and very well done. First of all, I am interested to know how long it takes for you to cover all the slides with your class? :D

Since I have been doing some research on the problem of evil and wish to teach a course on this subject some day (secretly I am planning for a book on it), may I raise some questions for discussion?

I understand that your approach to the so-called problem of evil is the standard one in philosophy of religion. My approach instead is meant to be “theological” (or theological anthropological) but likewise begins with the “logical argument”. Yet I would not bother to consider its logical validity or possible counter-arguments. My question is: do we really understand what we mean by the premises and the concepts they use: omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence -- in other words, do we understand God?, or whether the God presupposed in the premises of the argument resembles the God we Christians believe in and worship? Above all, do we understand what “evil” is? The word “evil” has been abused especially in contemporary political and moral propaganda, and even philosophical and theological discourse, so much so that any suffering or pain or whatever we dislike/disagree with is easily called “evil” (look how George W Bush deploys it). Our first task should be to "understand" evil, or more precisely its very “incomprehensibilility” (where evil is by definition "pointless" as Stanley Hauerwas and many others have contended) -- i.e. we need to admit at the very beginning that we don't and can't or even should not "understand" or "make sense of" evil.

Indeed, what is most objectionable of the mainstream philosophical approaches to the problem of evil, and various theodicies, is that they trivialise the various phenomena of (natural, moral and “structural” or “systemic”) evil in both their description and their “explanation” of them. You may also be aware of the growing literature of “anti-theodicy” which argues that the very attempt to explain (away) or "justify" evil is immoral, especially vis-à-vis the victims. (Notably: Terrence W Tilley (1991), The Evils of Theodicy, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press; and D. Z. Phillips (2005), The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress.) Or, to put it in even stronger terms, our effort to exonerate God from the facts of evils, to turn Him into someone who is responsible and yet not responsible, is itself blasphemous. The points being made here, so vividly dramatised in the story of Job, is indeed most familiar to us Christians.

Following the anti-theodicians, I would suggest that the problem of evil is a “lived” question, not philosophical or abstract, and it calls for an existential (not intellectual) answer. The genuine problem for us is not to “understand” evil, but to live with it. In the special terminology of Gabriel Marcel, the so-called problem of evil is a “mystery”, not a “problem” at all. Of course, it does not mean that there is no problem as such here. There is at least this pertinent task: Not all suffering is evil – some are unnecessary and may be avoidable, some cannot, some are absolutely pointless, some partially explicable, and we are often unable to distinguish them even though we have all the rightful desire to tell them apart. That’s why we (as concrete, living and suffering individuals) will never cease posing the problem of evil again and again.

[sbchan]

哈哈，其實那些powerpoint 都不是我做的，是那位教授 (allen stairs)弄的。我只是個小小的TA而已。^^
而他都是用兩堂 (每堂五十分鐘)的時間來教完一個topic的。教得挺快。

其實我本身並不是宗教哲學的專家，只可以在這裡隨便談談。苦難論證的最大問題，其實可能不在理性上的接受，而是心理上的不安。或許，這就是你說的存在的問題吧。這個有點像戰爭。儘管我們能接受有些戰爭是正義的，應該打那仗的，但心理上總會有點不安，特別是當看見要死得多人的時候。嗯，某程度上，戰爭也是一種evil，只是正義戰爭似是necessary evil而已。

我會說，苦難問題有很多部份。哲學要解決的，是其中理性的部份。像苦難論證當中的邏輯問題，老實說，討論根本是集中在邏輯、可能世界等等理性技術上，「苦難」這個主角反而變了像客串過場而已。苦難論證的證據問題會讓苦難多些時間出場，但問題也還是圍繞著種種理性的見解。

其實所有做苦難論證的哲學家都同意一點：他們是不能，也不會去解決心理/情緒上的苦難問題的。這些，要留給其他人去解決好了。

面對不是純哲學的問題時，其實哲學家也似乎不用把問題通通解決掉的。集中在哲學的範疇，給那個問題一些貢獻，或許就盡了其的責任了。

言不盡意。^^

[銀狐]

Many thanks for sharing with us your teaching materials. The powerpoint is eminently clear and very well done. First of all, I am interested to know how long it takes for you to cover all the slides with your class? :D

Since I have been doing some research on the problem of evil and wish to teach a course on this subject some day (secretly I am planning for a book on it), may I raise some questions for discussion?

I understand that your approach to the so-called problem of evil is the standard one in philosophy of religion. My approach instead is meant to be “theological” (or theological anthropological) but likewise begins with the “logical argument”. Yet I would not bother to consider its logical validity or possible counter-arguments. My question is: do we really understand what we mean by the premises and the concepts they use: omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence -- in other words, do we understand God?, or whether the God presupposed in the premises of the argument resembles the God we Christians believe in and worship? Above all, do we understand what “evil” is? The word “evil” has been abused especially in contemporary political and moral propaganda, and even philosophical and theological discourse, so much so that any suffering or pain or whatever we dislike/disagree with is easily called “evil” (look how George W Bush deploys it). Our first task should be to "understand" evil, or more precisely its very “incomprehensibilility” (where evil is by definition "pointless" as Stanley Hauerwas and many others have contended) -- i.e. we need to admit at the very beginning that we don't and can't or even should not "understand" or "make sense of" evil.

Indeed, what is most objectionable of the mainstream philosophical approaches to the problem of evil, and various theodicies, is that they trivialise the various phenomena of (natural, moral and “structural” or “systemic”) evil in both their description and their “explanation” of them. You may also be aware of the growing literature of “anti-theodicy” which argues that the very attempt to explain (away) or "justify" evil is immoral, especially vis-à-vis the victims. (Notably: Terrence W Tilley (1991), The Evils of Theodicy, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press; and D. Z. Phillips (2005), The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress.) Or, to put it in even stronger terms, our effort to exonerate God from the facts of evils, to turn Him into someone who is responsible and yet not responsible, is itself blasphemous. The points being made here, so vividly dramatised in the story of Job, is indeed most familiar to us Christians.

Following the anti-theodicians, I would suggest that the problem of evil is a “lived” question, not philosophical or abstract, and it calls for an existential (not intellectual) answer. The genuine problem for us is not to “understand” evil, but to live with it. In the special terminology of Gabriel Marcel, the so-called problem of evil is a “mystery”, not a “problem” at all. Of course, it does not mean that there is no problem as such here. There is at least this pertinent task: Not all suffering is evil – some are unnecessary and may be avoidable, some cannot, some are absolutely pointless, some partially explicable, and we are often unable to distinguish them even though we have all the rightful desire to tell them apart. That’s why we (as concrete, living and suffering individuals) will never cease posing the problem of evil again and again.

好嗎?
http://www.christianroundtable.org/forum/showthread.php?p=19724#post19724

很巧合，我剛回應過張國棟，也有提過約伯Post #27

[clement]

我有幾點想回應。

I understand that your approach to the so-called problem of evil is the standard one in philosophy of religion. My approach instead is meant to be “theological” (or theological anthropological) but likewise begins with the “logical argument”. Yet I would not bother to consider its logical validity or possible counter-arguments. My question is: do we really understand what we mean by the premises and the concepts they use: omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence -- in other words, do we understand God?, or whether the God presupposed in the premises of the argument resembles the God we Christians believe in and worship? Above all, do we understand what “evil” is? The word “evil” has been abused especially in contemporary political and moral propaganda, and even philosophical and theological discourse, so much so that any suffering or pain or whatever we dislike/disagree with is easily called “evil” (look how George W Bush deploys it). Our first task should be to "understand" evil, or more precisely its very “incomprehensibilility” (where evil is by definition "pointless" as Stanley Hauerwas and many others have contended) -- i.e. we need to admit at the very beginning that we don't and can't or even should not "understand" or "make sense of" evil.

［你固然可以選擇自己不去談，去迴避邏輯性概念性的問題，但這個意願本身卻沒有規範性、應然性。就算「惡」這個詞被濫用，這也不等於說，「惡」就一定「無法理解」。起碼說，這個預設不是顯而易見的。更何況，何謂「濫用」也未能得到預先規定。這一連串聲稱只是要求認同，但缺乏說服力。］

Indeed, what is most objectionable of the mainstream philosophical approaches to the problem of evil, and various theodicies, is that they trivialise the various phenomena of (natural, moral and “structural” or “systemic”) evil in both their description and their “explanation” of them. You may also be aware of the growing literature of “anti-theodicy” which argues that the very attempt to explain (away) or "justify" evil is immoral, especially vis-à-vis the victims. (Notably: Terrence W Tilley (1991), The Evils of Theodicy, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press; and D. Z. Phillips (2005), The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress.) Or, to put it in even stronger terms, our effort to exonerate God from the facts of evils, to turn Him into someone who is responsible and yet not responsible, is itself blasphemous. The points being made here, so vividly dramatised in the story of Job, is indeed most familiar to us Christians.

［同樣，「瑣碎」這一個也是有欠嚴謹的詞語。要理解「瑣碎」，就要理解何謂「不瑣碎」，而「不瑣碎」彷彿是被假定似的，這樣就不構成一個強烈有效的異議了。另外，你既然肯去考慮反神義論的「論點」，卻不肯去考慮神義論的「論點」，假定兩者同樣是理論性的，你卻賦予不同的對待，這在你個人的信念層面上還說得過去，但作為一個主張就需要更多的論證了。況且，當你要「以更強的言辭」說的時候，你沒有相應地給予「更強的」論證，只是順著剛才議論的流程順水推舟。］

Following the anti-theodicians, I would suggest that the problem of evil is a “lived” question, not philosophical or abstract, and it calls for an existential (not intellectual) answer. The genuine problem for us is not to “understand” evil, but to live with it. In the special terminology of Gabriel Marcel, the so-called problem of evil is a “mystery”, not a “problem” at all. Of course, it does not mean that there is no problem as such here. There is at least this pertinent task: Not all suffering is evil – some are unnecessary and may be avoidable, some cannot, some are absolutely pointless, some partially explicable, and we are often unable to distinguish them even though we have all the rightful desire to tell them apart. That’s why we (as concrete, living and suffering individuals) will never cease posing the problem of evil again and again.[/QUOTE]

［其實我們沒有需要預先就假定「哲學的」和「抽象的」討論就必定與「實存的」、「活生生的」（lived）討論是對立的。這些關於對立的主張甚至偏見可能是動聽的，但需要仔細地批判地檢視。康德寫過論一切神義論的不可能性，雖然是「哲學的」和「抽象的」，但就在在流露出他的實存關懷。同樣，「理解惡」和「與惡同活」也不是對立的，為何「理解」要被排除在「生活」的範圍之外？一邊生活，一邊反思，為何不可？］

［此外，你只能說明神義論問題在某些情況下可能產生，但就沒有實質地點出神義論問題本身有甚麼理論性問題，充其量只是說「exonerate God from the facts of evils, to turn Him into someone who is responsible and yet not responsible」了，但神義論果真都是這樣嗎？］

[clement]

理性上的接受，與心理上的不安，都是有關聯的。就算我們不談「上帝」或者「理論」，改談「生命」，其實問題仍然存在，只是改裝了：為何「生命」本身竟然會包含著被認為是「惡」的因素？

只要我們不要預先把哲學限定為論辯之爭（arguments or argumentation），而是一種批判反思的活動（philosophising），那麼哲學要解決的，不但是其中的理性部分，也包括實存的部分；而哲學思考的這種活動並不會與實存關懷或者知性排斥。

我並不認為惡的問題必須預先被假定為只能以實存的方式來回應，或者預先被假定為、化約為一種「牧養」問題（「牧養問題」固然是一種合理關懷，同樣「知性問題」也是一種合理關懷），彷彿惡的問題本身不是一個正當的問題。惡的問題不必一定要表現為「苦難論證」，也可以表現為「對惡／苦難的反省」，而這種反省既可以有反思的環節，也可以有行動的環節。



其實我本身並不是宗教哲學的專家，只可以在這裡隨便談談。苦難論證的最大問題，其實可能不在理性上的接受，而是心理上的不安。或許，這就是你說的存在的問題吧。這個有點像戰爭。儘管我們能接受有些戰爭是正義的，應該打那仗的，但心理上總會有點不安，特別是當看見要死得多人的時候。嗯，某程度上，戰爭也是一種evil，只是正義戰爭似是necessary evil而已。

我會說，苦難問題有很多部份。哲學要解決的，是其中理性的部份。像苦難論證當中的邏輯問題，老實說，討論根本是集中在邏輯、可能世界等等理性技術上，「苦難」這個主角反而變了像客串過場而已。苦難論證的證據問題會讓苦難多些時間出場，但問題也還是圍繞著種種理性的見解。

其實所有做苦難論證的哲學家都同意一點：他們是不能，也不會去解決心理/情緒上的苦難問題的。這些，要留給其他人去解決好了。

面對不是純哲學的問題時，其實哲學家也似乎不用把問題通通解決掉的。集中在哲學的範疇，給那個問題一些貢獻，或許就盡了其的責任了。

言不盡意。^^

[alexyu]

Hi, I read part of the slide and would like to throw in my 2-cent-worth opinion.

One slide says: In the real world, pain and suffering often don’t seem proportional to sin –The Afghanis are no more sinful than the Swiss, but have suffered more.

However, what is proportional to sin?

Interestingly enough, recently I downloaded a series of Buddhism lectures by Li, Jung San. In one lecture Li said that Afghanis deserve facing the war after September 11, 2001 because their narrow-minded behaviors is a threat to the heritage of world civilizations.

Robert McNamara, the author of "In retrospect" and the movie maker of "The fog of war" accused that the punishment of Japan during WWII is disproportional to their crime. I was puzzled when I heard his statement. Thirty millions Chinese were killed during the war. Numerous Southeast asians were also victimized.

Whether the suffering is proportional or disproportional, on many occassions, depends on one's political orientation. Perhaps you may consider to drop this point from the slide in order to avoid side-tracking debate. Just my 2-cent.

[alexyu]

Slide 17: Planting points out: it is an adequate defense

You mean Plantinga, right?

[sbchan]

Slide 17: Planting points out: it is an adequate defense

You mean Plantinga, right?


Haha, I guess so. ^^

Oh, again, these slides are written by the instructor, Professor Allen Stairs, but not me. He always has typo in his notes, and somehow it seems that students are familar with his 'style'. ^_^

[kcjeremy]

Yahoo新聞：乖巧女生回校帶團契遇襲 (http://hk.news.yahoo.com/061104/12/1vrlj.html)

面對如斯切身的「苦難」，很多時理性上的分析並不能太幫助到當事人。在這些 situations 下我們如何實踐「與哀哭的人同哭」的教導？:(

[sbchan]

Yahoo新聞：乖巧女生回校帶團契遇襲 (http://hk.news.yahoo.com/061104/12/1vrlj.html)

面對如斯切身的「苦難」，很多時理性上的分析並不能太幫助到當事人。在這些 situations 下我們如何實踐「與哀哭的人同哭」的教導？:(


對的，Alvin Plantinga等人早已明言，他們的論證不能也不會解決苦難論證帶來的心理問題，這不是他們的論證目的。

然而，這些論證的強處是告訴了人們，苦難問題本身不足以構成對神存在的挑戰。於是，剩下的，不是要告訴人神和苦難如何同時存在，而是要考慮如何安慰別人等等的心理輔導等。這就等於把問題層面縮小了。