sbchan
11-09-2006, 04:00 PM
AT A GLANCE: GOD AND MORALITY
1. Morality and God’s Commands: the Problem
• Suppose what God command is in fact morally right.
• We can ask: Does God command things because they’re right? Or is what God commands right because God commands it?
1.1. The Divine Command Theory
• The Divine Command Theory says that things are right or wrong because God commands or forbids them.
• Problem: Morality is not arbitrary. If God commanded cruelty, it would still not be right.
• Implication: The Divine Command Theory is wrong; if God’s commands are morally right, then it’s not simply because God gave the commands.
2. Some Objections
2.1. Objection #1: God Would Never Command Evil
• Reply: this misses the point. The question is whether things are evil because God forbids them or whether God forbids them because they are evil.
2.2. Objection #2: God Created Us, Therefore We’re Obliged to Obey
• Reply: we can imagine an evil creator whose commands were morally abominable.
2.3. Objection #3: Morality Needs Religion
• Reply: it’s not difficult even for atheists to give good reasons for saying that, e.g., stealing is wrong.
2.3.1. The “Queerness Problem”
• Moral facts seem “queer”: if moral facts existed, they would apparently be different from all other sorts of facts.
• It’s difficult to see how moral obligation could rest on nonmoral facts
• Apparent solution: let God’s commands determine right and wrong.
• Problem: God’s commands would simply be further facts.
3. Philip Quinn: Divine Command Ethics for Theists
• Quinn argues that the Divine Command Theory is the best way for theists to understand right and wrong.
3.1. Three Reasons
3.1.1. Sovereignty
• If God can’t make things right or wrong, then God isn’t completely sovereign.
3.1.2. Immoralities of the Patriarchs
• In the Bible, God commands things that violate usual moral rules.
• Therefore, God must have the power to make things right or wrong.
3.1.3. Commanded Love
• The commandment to love your neighbor as yourself goes beyond any ordinary human love.
• It is a duty for Christians.
• But it could only be a duty because it’s commanded by God.
3.2. Three Reasons Challenged
3.2.1. Sovereignty and Necessary Truths
• Moral truths are arguably necessary truths.
• It’s doubtful that God is sovereign over necessary truths.
3.2.2. “Immoralities of the Patriarchs?”
• It’s not difficult to imagine good moral reasons for commanding the Hebrews to plunder the Egyptians. And Abraham:
i. Knew that God could take care of Isaac even in death, and
ii. Could have had excellent reasons to trust God.
3.2.3. Commanded Love
• The most this example could show is that God can require things that go beyond ordinary duty.
• Ordinary morality can account for special obligations in cases where special relationships exist.
4. Robert Adams
• Adams thinks that for believers, “what’s morally right” and “what God wills” mean the same thing.
• Caveat: this is on the presumption that God is loving; if God commanded cruelty, believers would abandon this view.
• Reply: cruelty is wrong, period. This suggests that God forbids cruelty because it’s wrong. No need for Divine Command Theory.
5. Natural Law Theories
• Natural law theories offer another way of thinking about how God might be relevant to morality.
5.1. Providence
• Natural law theories assume divine Providence: God has ordered the world in a wise and good way.
• Natural law theories assume that we have a basic ability to tell right from wrong.
• Right and wrong depend on good and bad.
• Other theorists can agree: if a providential order does exist, it makes a moral difference.
6. God and Obligation
• Question: could appealing to God’s will help solve the “queerness problem”?
6.1. Value
• We can distinguish between value (good and bad) and obligation (right and wrong).
• Good and bad are (arguably) less puzzling than right and wrong.
6.2. Legal Obligation and Moral Obligation
• Legal obligations don’t exist without lawgivers.
• Legitimate laws come from legitimate authorities—authorities good enough to deserve our respect.
6.3. Divine Obligation
• Call “divine obligation” the kind of obligation we would be under if we submitted to God’s authority.
• If God exists, then it would be perfectly rational to submit to God’s authority
• Recognizing divine obligation would never conflict with any genuine moral obligations there might be
• Divine obligation would be no more mysterious than legal obligation.
• The theist need not decide whether divine obligation is moral obligation or is simply the perfect surrogate for it.
7. Knowing What to Do
• If the God of classical theism exists, then God’s will makes a moral difference—whether or not we equate morality with God’s will.
• For the theist, this raises the problem of knowing God’s will.
• Mistakes about this—or mistakes about the nature of the providential order—could have serious consequences.
7.1. Hypothetical Reasoning
• Reasoning hypothetically about what God would want could be useful for moral reasoning whether or not we think God exists.
7.1.1. Reason vs. Revelation
• The theist faces a potentially difficult problem: the results of this kind of hypothetical reasoning could conflict with supposedly genuine revelations.
• There may be no easy way for the theist to solve this problem
7.2. Coda
• The non-believer doesn’t have to try to solve conflicts between moral reasoning and revelation.
• The believer has no way to avoid the problem.
WEB RESOURCES
You can read Plato’s Euthyphro online at http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/euthyfro.html
On the fact that not all obligations must come from a lawgiver, see “Moral Arguments for the Existence of God,” Section 1.1 in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, found online at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-arguments-god
For more on natural law from the Roman Catholic perspective, go to
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09076a.htm
1. Morality and God’s Commands: the Problem
• Suppose what God command is in fact morally right.
• We can ask: Does God command things because they’re right? Or is what God commands right because God commands it?
1.1. The Divine Command Theory
• The Divine Command Theory says that things are right or wrong because God commands or forbids them.
• Problem: Morality is not arbitrary. If God commanded cruelty, it would still not be right.
• Implication: The Divine Command Theory is wrong; if God’s commands are morally right, then it’s not simply because God gave the commands.
2. Some Objections
2.1. Objection #1: God Would Never Command Evil
• Reply: this misses the point. The question is whether things are evil because God forbids them or whether God forbids them because they are evil.
2.2. Objection #2: God Created Us, Therefore We’re Obliged to Obey
• Reply: we can imagine an evil creator whose commands were morally abominable.
2.3. Objection #3: Morality Needs Religion
• Reply: it’s not difficult even for atheists to give good reasons for saying that, e.g., stealing is wrong.
2.3.1. The “Queerness Problem”
• Moral facts seem “queer”: if moral facts existed, they would apparently be different from all other sorts of facts.
• It’s difficult to see how moral obligation could rest on nonmoral facts
• Apparent solution: let God’s commands determine right and wrong.
• Problem: God’s commands would simply be further facts.
3. Philip Quinn: Divine Command Ethics for Theists
• Quinn argues that the Divine Command Theory is the best way for theists to understand right and wrong.
3.1. Three Reasons
3.1.1. Sovereignty
• If God can’t make things right or wrong, then God isn’t completely sovereign.
3.1.2. Immoralities of the Patriarchs
• In the Bible, God commands things that violate usual moral rules.
• Therefore, God must have the power to make things right or wrong.
3.1.3. Commanded Love
• The commandment to love your neighbor as yourself goes beyond any ordinary human love.
• It is a duty for Christians.
• But it could only be a duty because it’s commanded by God.
3.2. Three Reasons Challenged
3.2.1. Sovereignty and Necessary Truths
• Moral truths are arguably necessary truths.
• It’s doubtful that God is sovereign over necessary truths.
3.2.2. “Immoralities of the Patriarchs?”
• It’s not difficult to imagine good moral reasons for commanding the Hebrews to plunder the Egyptians. And Abraham:
i. Knew that God could take care of Isaac even in death, and
ii. Could have had excellent reasons to trust God.
3.2.3. Commanded Love
• The most this example could show is that God can require things that go beyond ordinary duty.
• Ordinary morality can account for special obligations in cases where special relationships exist.
4. Robert Adams
• Adams thinks that for believers, “what’s morally right” and “what God wills” mean the same thing.
• Caveat: this is on the presumption that God is loving; if God commanded cruelty, believers would abandon this view.
• Reply: cruelty is wrong, period. This suggests that God forbids cruelty because it’s wrong. No need for Divine Command Theory.
5. Natural Law Theories
• Natural law theories offer another way of thinking about how God might be relevant to morality.
5.1. Providence
• Natural law theories assume divine Providence: God has ordered the world in a wise and good way.
• Natural law theories assume that we have a basic ability to tell right from wrong.
• Right and wrong depend on good and bad.
• Other theorists can agree: if a providential order does exist, it makes a moral difference.
6. God and Obligation
• Question: could appealing to God’s will help solve the “queerness problem”?
6.1. Value
• We can distinguish between value (good and bad) and obligation (right and wrong).
• Good and bad are (arguably) less puzzling than right and wrong.
6.2. Legal Obligation and Moral Obligation
• Legal obligations don’t exist without lawgivers.
• Legitimate laws come from legitimate authorities—authorities good enough to deserve our respect.
6.3. Divine Obligation
• Call “divine obligation” the kind of obligation we would be under if we submitted to God’s authority.
• If God exists, then it would be perfectly rational to submit to God’s authority
• Recognizing divine obligation would never conflict with any genuine moral obligations there might be
• Divine obligation would be no more mysterious than legal obligation.
• The theist need not decide whether divine obligation is moral obligation or is simply the perfect surrogate for it.
7. Knowing What to Do
• If the God of classical theism exists, then God’s will makes a moral difference—whether or not we equate morality with God’s will.
• For the theist, this raises the problem of knowing God’s will.
• Mistakes about this—or mistakes about the nature of the providential order—could have serious consequences.
7.1. Hypothetical Reasoning
• Reasoning hypothetically about what God would want could be useful for moral reasoning whether or not we think God exists.
7.1.1. Reason vs. Revelation
• The theist faces a potentially difficult problem: the results of this kind of hypothetical reasoning could conflict with supposedly genuine revelations.
• There may be no easy way for the theist to solve this problem
7.2. Coda
• The non-believer doesn’t have to try to solve conflicts between moral reasoning and revelation.
• The believer has no way to avoid the problem.
WEB RESOURCES
You can read Plato’s Euthyphro online at http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/euthyfro.html
On the fact that not all obligations must come from a lawgiver, see “Moral Arguments for the Existence of God,” Section 1.1 in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, found online at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-arguments-god
For more on natural law from the Roman Catholic perspective, go to
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09076a.htm