Daniel_Cheung
08-19-2007, 09:49 PM
無意中找到有這樣一篇論文， Sosa, "Serious Philosophy and Freedom of Spirit"，這是 1987 被The Philosopher's Annual 選為十大 1987 論文之一的。題目很特別，原來內容是指哲學研究的兩類主要進路。其中被稱為 free spirit 的一派，大概就是所謂的後現代思想， serious philosophy 一派，大概就是所謂的英美分析哲學。文中，哲學教授 Sosa 無意說 serious philosophy 比較好，但是他想回應幾個由 free spirit 人士提出的關於 serious philosophy 的批評。以下是第一節和第三節的節錄，有興趣朋友可要到大學圖書館找找看。
PHILOSOPHERS have long taken sides in a great divide by adopting one or more of a set of views that tend to go together:
FREEDOM
Subjectivism
Relativism
Antirealism
Historicism
SERIOUSNESS
Objectivism
Absolutism
Realism
Universalism
On the left is "free-spirited philosophy"; on the right "serious philosophy." I wish to layout a view of seriousness, and to consider recent attacks on that view from the side of the free spirited: deconstruction and textualism, hermeneutics, critical theory, and the new pragmatism. Without defining what all forms of freedom have in common, I shall draw from them a combined critique against seriousness. I will also examine, occasionally and in passing, positive ideas conjured up by the free. But mainly I wish to consider their combined critique of seriousness. The combined critique - labeled here "free spirit" for convenience - is not one that all "free spirits" would accept. But all sides do contribute, some more extensively than others. Moreover, the influence of free spirits extends far beyond academic philosophy. It is found not only in historical studies, with Michel Foucault, but also in literary and critical theory, now widespread, with Jacques Derrida, Richard Rorty, and less serious cohorts. An allied phenomenon in legal scholarship is the critical legal studies movement, whose theorist
Roberto Unger preaches the sway of ideology over all value and norm, and the optionality and groundlessness of all politico-legal frameworks; and also advocates constant change and revision framework shattering (groundlessly for its own sake, presumably).
...
II
...
This introductory section has made the following six points:
(a) Serious philosophy encompasses Platonic traditions of objective realism.
(b) It believes in real objects of knowledge and in objective methods for reason.
(c) Seriousness and freedom lie at opposite ends of a spectrum; most of us fall somewhere in the middle.
(d) Perhaps no celebrated school or movement lies today near the serious end-but that is of limited importance.
(e) The division between seriousness and freedom is not geographical or ideological.
(f) No positive argument for seriousness shall be offered here-only a defense against attacks from the side of freedom.
III. OBJECTIONS TO THE TRADITION OF SERIOUSNESS
It has been charged that only an unwarranted fear supports the tradition of serious philosophy, a threatening either/or: either there is the fixed, binding framework of reason, or we face intellectual and moral arbitrariness and chaos. According to some, it is this Cartesian anxiety that needs to be exorcised. Once emancipated from that dichotomy, we may then move beyond objectivism and relativism, a task more practical than theoretical. What the world needs now is a profound recognition that the proper end of man is not to mirror passively any dead objective reality, but to work actively for solidarity among the living. Two chief arguments urged by free spirits deserve serious attention.
The first is an argument against theoria and for phronesis, against the possibility of algorithmic calculation on any question of values, be it practical or theoretical, and in favor of deliberation and wise judgment. The second flows from the alleged failure of serious philosophy. "Given its total lack of success," we are told, "it is time to
put a stop to its pretensions. Epistemology in particular deserves to be laid to rest, for its oft-repeated lie that it would found culture if allowed the time and attention." We consider these two arguments in turn.
...
PHILOSOPHERS have long taken sides in a great divide by adopting one or more of a set of views that tend to go together:
FREEDOM
Subjectivism
Relativism
Antirealism
Historicism
SERIOUSNESS
Objectivism
Absolutism
Realism
Universalism
On the left is "free-spirited philosophy"; on the right "serious philosophy." I wish to layout a view of seriousness, and to consider recent attacks on that view from the side of the free spirited: deconstruction and textualism, hermeneutics, critical theory, and the new pragmatism. Without defining what all forms of freedom have in common, I shall draw from them a combined critique against seriousness. I will also examine, occasionally and in passing, positive ideas conjured up by the free. But mainly I wish to consider their combined critique of seriousness. The combined critique - labeled here "free spirit" for convenience - is not one that all "free spirits" would accept. But all sides do contribute, some more extensively than others. Moreover, the influence of free spirits extends far beyond academic philosophy. It is found not only in historical studies, with Michel Foucault, but also in literary and critical theory, now widespread, with Jacques Derrida, Richard Rorty, and less serious cohorts. An allied phenomenon in legal scholarship is the critical legal studies movement, whose theorist
Roberto Unger preaches the sway of ideology over all value and norm, and the optionality and groundlessness of all politico-legal frameworks; and also advocates constant change and revision framework shattering (groundlessly for its own sake, presumably).
...
II
...
This introductory section has made the following six points:
(a) Serious philosophy encompasses Platonic traditions of objective realism.
(b) It believes in real objects of knowledge and in objective methods for reason.
(c) Seriousness and freedom lie at opposite ends of a spectrum; most of us fall somewhere in the middle.
(d) Perhaps no celebrated school or movement lies today near the serious end-but that is of limited importance.
(e) The division between seriousness and freedom is not geographical or ideological.
(f) No positive argument for seriousness shall be offered here-only a defense against attacks from the side of freedom.
III. OBJECTIONS TO THE TRADITION OF SERIOUSNESS
It has been charged that only an unwarranted fear supports the tradition of serious philosophy, a threatening either/or: either there is the fixed, binding framework of reason, or we face intellectual and moral arbitrariness and chaos. According to some, it is this Cartesian anxiety that needs to be exorcised. Once emancipated from that dichotomy, we may then move beyond objectivism and relativism, a task more practical than theoretical. What the world needs now is a profound recognition that the proper end of man is not to mirror passively any dead objective reality, but to work actively for solidarity among the living. Two chief arguments urged by free spirits deserve serious attention.
The first is an argument against theoria and for phronesis, against the possibility of algorithmic calculation on any question of values, be it practical or theoretical, and in favor of deliberation and wise judgment. The second flows from the alleged failure of serious philosophy. "Given its total lack of success," we are told, "it is time to
put a stop to its pretensions. Epistemology in particular deserves to be laid to rest, for its oft-repeated lie that it would found culture if allowed the time and attention." We consider these two arguments in turn.
...