前言

[Daniel_Cheung]

在時間表裡我們沒有撥出時間討論〈前言〉，但我看後有少許意見，寫在這裡，有興趣朋友請隨便回應，接續討論。（由於我近日不多機會上網，可能我只開了話閘子，讓各位繼續。）




談第一章之先，我想先說說英文版原著裡的 Foreword。在那裡，林貝克交代了他寫這書的緣由。他親身參與了普世教會的對話達二十五年之久，察覺到沒有一個合用的理論架構，例如大家無法確定為何某些教義嚴重到是分裂教會，某些教義卻不然（p.7，英文版）。不過，他又強調，他在這書提出的理論並不假定任何普世教會合一的前提或關懷，甚至，這理論可應用至基督教以外的宗教（p. 8）。他又強調，他要提出的理論並不是一個更高層次的中立觀點（p. 11）。從第8, 9, 11幾頁裡看到，林貝克把他的努力視作Thomas Kuhn 提出的那種 paradigm shift （這名稱有很多中譯，我暫用範式轉移），在神學思維裡作出一個很根本的變更。


然而，有關這Foreword，我有幾點不太明白，或不知作者想暗示甚麼。各位可有高見？

首先，在第八頁，他說， "A theory of religion and doctrine cannot be ecumenically useful unless it is nonecumenically plausible." 從上文下理看，他的意思應是，他從普世基督宗教對話裡想出的這理論並不單適用於分析教內對話。然而，這句話始終略嫌 too strong ，並且沒有必要。

接著，他在第八至九頁提出一個心理學實驗，其中，有大部份人能輕易看出一疊紙牌裡有異樣的東西（例如多了一些牌），但有一小撮人卻總看不出來，於是很不開心。作者想得出的結論是： theologians sometimes behave similarly. Anomalies accumulate, old categories fail, and with luck or skill - both attributed by believers to grace - new concepts are found that better serve to account for the data. If they are not found, the consequences can be intellectually and religiously traumatic. 然而，我不明白他想用這比喻來說明甚麼。這比喻來自 Thomas Kuhn 的書，原是比喻一些在舊有範式裡的科學家面對舊理論無法解釋的東西時可能會出現的acute personal distress。只是，在宗教裡，在基督宗教裡，真的有類似自然科學發展的那些與既有理論格格不入的「證據」，而又是神學家們覺得如果無法解釋之就寢食難安的「證據」或「事實」麼？在科學哲學裡，縱然有人會質疑「證據」、「觀察」、「事實」的獨立客觀性，但始終那些所謂客觀東西對科學理論的挑戰是很鮮明的，難以逃避的。然而，在宗教裡，很多神學理論的詮釋卻是難以被一些所謂客觀經驗所印證或否證的。簡單的論述如「上帝聽了我禱告」已十分難否證。這個，林貝克本人也說了： comprehensive outlooks on religion, not to mention religions themselves, are not susceptible to decisive confirmation or disconfirmation (p. 11)。那麼，那紙牌比喻有何意義？

當然，更廣大的問題是，林貝克用 Thomas Kuhn 的範式來借喻他現在要提出的理論，是否合宜？這問題可未必是現在可以好好回應的，大概要讀完這書後才可以回來答這個。

[Ming Yuen Yee]

I have the same problem with that psychological experiment on pp.8-9. Don't know what is its point or its relevance. :confused: I agree that "anomalies", if they do exist at all in theology, are not that "compelling" (epistemologically, though not psychologically) as in the natural sciences.

After reading the book for the first time, I have the strong feeling that it is undeniably the product of its time (thus quite dated). Like many others in different academic fields, including theology, Lindbeck simply takes for granted that:


he understands what Kuhn says about paradigms and paradigm shift (not too many philosophers of science would share such confidence now);
Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions in the natural sciences is proven true; and
this theory is equally applicable to intellectual changes in other disciplines too (including theology).


If my understanding of the history of reception of Kuhn's book is correct, this kind of (mis)appropriation has been a very pervasive phenomenon in the 1970s, up to late 1980s. But now, with the Kuhnian fashion subsided, we should know better with hindsight. Yet, the process of "Kuhnification" continues, according to Steve Fuller, namely sometimes some academic disciplines continue to self-consciously impose upon its self-image the paradigm shift in order to justify or rationalise or promote its intra-disciplinary intellectual changes.

I will have more to say regarding Lindbeck's uses of Geertz and Wittgenstein when we come to that.

[Ming Yuen Yee]

I think it is important to pay attention to the context and intention of Lindbeck's development of a theory of doctrine.

Most intriguingly, his theory is self-consciously not a theological theory, but philosophical and social-scientific, yet it is simultaneously theologically sound and ecumenically useful (pp.7-8), hence his uncritical use of Kuhn, Geertz and Wittgenstein. It does not matter to Lindbeck whether these authors' theories are correct or not in their own rights, as long as they furnish the building blocks for his theory, whose cogency will then be tested with some specific aims in mind. The polemical context also dictates that Lindbeck does not have to prove his cultural-linguistic model true and the other two false. He only has to show that it is plausible and no less plausible than the other two models. Hence the structure of the book:

Ch.1 The problem statement -- which specifies what the theory of religion should address and explain, and how the rival theories should be evaluated
Ch.2 Comparison of the three models of religion, in non-theological terms
Ch.3 Evaluation of the cultural-linguistic model regarding its explanatory power of the possibility of inter-religious dialogue

Ch.4 The rule-theory of doctrine (developed from the cultural-linguistic model) as a test of its theological and ecumenical usefulness, and what the theory should address and explain
Ch.5 Evaluation of the rule-theory of doctrine in a Christian context

Ch.6 It is only after the plausibility of the cultural-linguistic model is "established" that Lindbeck spells out his "intra-textual theology" (deriving some theological implications from a non-theological theory?)

Lindbeck seems to have in mind a clear and firm separation of "the theological" and "the non-theological". When he says that, "A theory of religion and doctrine cannot be ecumenically useful unless it is nonecumenically plausible" (p.8), he is committed to the highest illuminating, explanatory and generalising power of his proposed theory of religion/doctrine.

It may be helpful if we keep his argumentative structure in mind, which Lindbeck admits is circular (p.11).

[Ming Yuen Yee]

I also wish to flag up the following for everyone's attention at the beginning.

After reading the book I am still not very sure I understand how does Lindbeck define and distinguish these concepts:


Religion
Doctrine
Theology
First-order religious propositions or truth-claims


Alternatively put, what is "first-order", "second-order", or even "the third" in religion? How to distinguish them?

In addition, what is the place of "story" or "narrative" in Lindbeck's theory of religion/doctrine? Is doctrine the context for understanding the story, or the other way round? Which is more "foundational"? This is interesting given that Lindbeck is widely regarded as a major figure of the Yale School of narrative theology.

I will return to this after we all finish the book.

[Daniel_Cheung]

It may be helpful if we keep his argumentative structure in mind, which Lindbeck admits is circular (p.11).
幾天沒上網，現在才有機會看和回應。我也有留意他說 circular 這一點。我有這樣的理解：由於他嘗試 make a case and argue that it is plausible ，他所提出的會是一個 best explanation to a set of data 。大凡 explanation ，若讀者不了解這角度地看，很容易會覺得那只是循環論證。

[boundary]

問番轉頭添，對不起。但應如何理解 Linkbeck以下這句話？這句話在理解整本書有重要性嗎？

The case developed in this book, it should be noted, is circular rather than linear. Its persuasiveness, if any, does not depend on moving step by step in a demonstrative sequences, but on the illuminating power of the whole. (p.11)

[Daniel_Cheung]

問番轉頭添，對不起。但應如何理解 Linkbeck以下這句話？這句話在理解整本書有重要性嗎？

The case developed in this book, it should be noted, is circular rather than linear. Its persuasiveness, if any, does not depend on moving step by step in a demonstrative sequences, but on the illuminating power of the whole. (p.11)

這句話，自第一章起，我便一直記著，現在看到第五章，回來說這個，頗為適合。愚見認為，這是有些重要性的，但卻不多。當人們為某事提供解釋 explanation 時，很多時要到差不多講完了，對方才能把不同的細節串連起來，發現那解釋是很合理的。這是一種尋找 best explanation 時的現象。套回林貝克這書，其實他的觀點，比較哲理的概念在第二、三章已全交代了，但具體地應用出來卻要等到第四、五章，尤其第五章，逐一看三條教義。如此，他應該期望讀者至少看到第五章才蓋棺定論。

（但這講法有少許困難。因為二、三章談的是要用文化語意進路作為對宗教的理解，四、五章談的，是教義作為規則。這兩個不同焦點如何融合，是林貝克沒有清楚交代的。）

不管怎樣，林貝克這寫法的一個好處是，有些觀點未必可以初次出現時就講得清楚，讀者或需要別的觀點才能好好地明白。那麼，作者就沒有太大壓力，要在每一觀點初次出現時作出一個十分完善的解說（在每一觀點初次出現時作出一個十分完善的解說，是學術寫作上一個頗普遍的要求）。對讀者來說，他們要提醒自己，作者對某些觀點所提供的理由，並不限於作者主要談論那觀點的段落或章節，卻可能散見於全書。作者的輕鬆，其實是把擔子轉嫁給讀者，讀者若要掌握作者對某些觀點的思路，必須 keep an eye of relevant issues throughout the whole book ，自行重構作者在全書各處提及相關的事。

這種所謂 non-linear 的寫作，在強調語意跟文化有關的人來說，是很常見的，因為他們不太願意相信幾個句子（命題）可以把要說的東西說清楚。

只不過，這種寫作也有高手與低手之別。現在我已讀了第五章，發現有些不對勁的地方。無疑，這類尋找 best explanation 的討論，要看得整體，然而，正如我一直指出，林貝克本人對其觀點的解說是十分沒組織的，即使他一開始就寫出這個「免責條款」，最後也沒有替他帶來很大效益。因為林貝克本人沒有 done a good job 使讀者可以在串連起各章內容時，發現他的文化語意進路是優勝的。例如他在第三章提到 Austin 的 performative use of language ，在那裡我的解讀是，這概念把教義非命題化（林的用法其實是，de-ontologization ，非本體化，稱之為非命題化是很嚴重的哲學錯誤），變成一個必須有信徒生活行動參與才能使之為真的事件。這是林貝克反對命題進路的重要一步。然而，他的處理卻十分隨便，若讀者不是對相關理論有認識（即好像我這樣一個哲學人），很難掌握他究竟想怎樣。除了解說不清外，另一問題是，這個應該是十分重要的概念，在往後幾章（除了我未看的貌似總結的第六章）裡，完全沒有提過。那麼，這叫讀者做甚麼整體性思考來發現其 best explanation 的價值？

又以 first-order propositions 跟 second-order propositions 為例，這是由第二章起一直有使用的概念，即使林貝克沒有作出一個十分精準的定義，讀者應該可以在每次使用時漸漸掌握這區分。然而，現在我已讀到第五章，尚未能整理到一個清晰的概念可以掌握，相反，他在第五章談實際應用時，開始令我感到他有些混亂，因為他有時想說，其實他的規則理論跟命題理論分別很少。

對我來說，最 notorious 的，要算是他在第四章的 taxonomy of doctrines ，把教義分類為甚麼 temporary, conditional, reversible, essential, accidental, necessary，接著在第五章再來個 irreformable 。這些用詞，他毫無解釋，而讀者看畢數章後，仍是無法疏理出究竟每一種教義有甚麼特別之處，足以作出這樣的區分，例如 essential 跟 necessary 有何分別？ Irreversible 跟 irreformable 是否同義詞？ Temporary 跟 conditional 又是否同義詞？這沒有讓讀者有足夠資料自行看出它們如何能 best explain 教義，顯然是林貝克組織和表達不力，毫不嚴謹。