第六章 走向後自由主義神學

[Daniel_Cheung]

終於寫完一份論文，現在可以回來談談這書最後一章。暫時看了兩節，但由於接著幾天要出門，所以先貼出我的評論。今次我用英文寫，因為看書時身邊沒有中文輸入的電腦。我會在分題裡以中文標題寫出，方便閱讀。

但評論第六章前，我想提一提上一章的討論裡我們談過 Tracy 怎樣看經典 classic (http://s-h-c.org/forum/showthread.php?t=4604&page=4) 。原來林貝克在第六章的註釋４裡也有提到。一如我所料，他並不認同 Tracy 的看法，他只願意沿用社會科學的角度，只關心經典對社群的功能和意義，而毫不理會經典本身有何特別，能發揮這種功能。

See fn. 4 for how Lindbeck understands classics. To him, it doesn't matter what makes a text classics, he just cares about what is powerful enough to shape the thought and experience of a community. So, actually, the text could be as lousy and stupid as comic books. It is irrelevant to be concerned about the good-making quality of what people called classics. Again, while it makes sense in social scientific point of view, as I have always been acknowledging, why should theologians overlook the good-making quality and just take whatever HAPPENS to be influential to be classic/doctrine?

[Daniel_Cheung]

基本上，我對這兩節的整體看法是，一，林貝克提出一個文化語意進路的後自由神學 postliberal theology，與他之前提出的文化語意進路的宗教理論，及文化語意進路的教義觀，本應是不同的東西，但他卻在這章把三者說成彷彿是同一樣東西。這令他在這章想表達的觀點，難以理解，缺乏說服力。二，為突顯文化語意進路的後自由神學，林貝克一如以往，要批評自由神學以經驗為先，也要批評傳統神學以命題為先。然而，在神學建構過程裡，是否那麼容易判斷「以經驗為先」和「以命題為先」？畢竟，「以經驗為先」和「以命題為先」意義十分含糊。我十分懷疑這點，若這懷疑成立，至少在這一章所定義出來的後自由神學，其實沒有甚麼獨特性，犯不上稱為一個新學派。

有別於以往，我今次不寫詳細的撮要了，只是按一些要點寫評論。留意，以下寫的「林貝克的論點」，並不欲指那一小段或那幾句，而是那幾句代表著的一些他的觀點。因此，請勿誤會我只是在評論某幾句。

＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝

林貝克的論點：

Here Lindbeck's purpose is to show that his theory is useful in other areas of theological studies rather than doctrines. He claims that, without this, his theory is still unacceptable. He gives himself three targets: faithfulness, applicability, and intelligibility.

評論：林貝克在這裡初次提出的文化語意進路下的神學，為何卻說到好像等同於之前幾章講的文化語意進路下的宗教理論和文化語意進路下的教義觀？他有沒有想過，這三者其實並不相同，不能隨便混為一談？

It is surprising to see that Lindbeck claims that in the previous chapter she was presenting three theories about theology but not about religion or about doctrine. (pp.112-113) He is either too careless in wording or have deeper theoretical confusion.

'The problem, as we have noted in earlier chapters, is that each type of theology is embedded in a conceptual framework so comprehensive that it shapes its own criteria of adequacy.' (p. 113)

So, now he has given us three theories about religion, three theories about doctrines and three theories about theology. This is theoretical possible that he could do three things in one shot. However, the substance of worry is that Lindbeck apparently making identity claim, i.e., the x theory of A is just the x theory of B. (x: cultural-lingustic, experiential-expressive, cognitive-propositional. A, B, C: religion, doctrine, theology). If he is implicitly making this identity claim, he is begging the question. He does not have to show how useful his cultural-linguistic approach is useful to theology because , to him, its usefulness on religion and doctrine has long been proven. If now they are all the same, then its usefulness on theology can automatically be taken as proven as well.

In other words, it could be challenged what exactly is the cultural-linguistic theory of theology that is distinct from a cultural-linguistic theory of religion and a cultural-linguistic theory of doctrines. Without such clarification, the whole chapter 6 doesn't make much sense.


林貝克的論點：

Section I Faithfulness

He argues that meaning is to be 'constituted by the uses of a specific language rather than being distinguishablefrom it. Thus the proper way to determine what "God" signifies, for example, is by examining how the word operates within a religion and thereby shapes reality and experience rather than by first establishing its propositional or experiential meaning and reinterpreting or reformulating its uses accordingly.' (p. 114).

評論：究竟在甚麼意義下神學活動才是採用了經驗表達進路或認知命題進路？這三分恰當嗎？

This is a very poor way of making the contrast. If it could be said to have three such distinct approach, if we put ourselves into the shoes of the other two approaches, we do not see them 'first establishing ["God's"] propositional or experiential meaning and reinterpreting or reformulating its uses accordingly.' For example, a medieval theologian who knows a lot about Plato and Aristotle also knows a lot about , of course, the bible. When he comes to construct a philosophically intelligible interpretation of the Christian faith, he takes his understanding of the bible (and from the church) to be the raw data and find out some propositional truth in them. Then he eventually gets some propositions which he calls Truth of God. Does this mean that he first establishes some propositions and then sort of forces the Christian God into the category of those propositions? Not at all!

OK, 'first' may not be understood as a temporal term regarding how a theologian constructs their views. Maybe it only means taking something (proposition or experience) as the foundation of their theories. But again, we can have the above question as whether it is really so. And, from an argumentative point of view, since Lindbeck defines, without a trace of hesitation, his opponents as always taking propositions or experience as primary and interpret everything out of them, Lindbeck's present criticism to them is actually a circular reasoning.

To use a more mundane example, let us consider 10 believers, each of which in their lives experienced God as a very powerful agent capable of evening changing the weather. When they come to share their experience and understanding of God, they naturally come to the conclusion that "Our God is an omnipotent God and it confirms what we learn in the Bible. Amen." Is this claim of omnipotence guilty of being based on propositions or experience? Are they justified in inferring some attributes of God from their godly experience and cognition? Is the meaning of God in their thought intratextual or extratextual? Since the word or concept 'omnipotence' is arguably not present in the text of the Bible, does it mean that the language of the bible is not comprehensive? It is easy to talk in fancy and mushy ways. But when it comes to real-life example, many of those talks could turn out to be empty.

[Daniel_Cheung]

林貝克的論點：

Arguing that meaning must be located within the texts, Lindbeck goes on to say that the language of religion is too comprehensive everything else should be understood through its lenses. "Further, such works shape the imagination and perceptions of the attentive reader so that he or she forever views the world to some extent through the lenses they supply." (pp. 116-117). "Intratextual theology redescribes reality within the scriptural framework rather than translating Scripture into extrascriptural categories. It is the text, so to speak, which absorbs the world, rather than the world the text." (p. 118)

評論：文本內與文本外，究竟是怎樣區分的呢？

What I commented above actually can just be used to comment this. The notion of confining meaning or theology to intratextual business is very vague. In case of the 10 believers above, are they going extratextual at all? How to judge? And the way he defines the criterion of faithfulness does not rule out the ten believers to come to a conclusion that God is omnipotent because they are still focusing on God's character depicted in the stories of Israel and of Jesus and in their real experience which is seen through the lenses of such narratives.

Let me discuss one more issue here. Nowadays we have scientific knowledge and a lot of other views, like the theory of relativity and the view of democracy. These are alien to the biblical language. How is a Christian going to make sense of them? Should we take them very lightly just because they are not clearly suggested by an ancient text which is more concerned about religious matters? How can such a text absorb the world of science and contemporary social system as democracy? Actually, it may not be a possible way out to claim that one is about religion and the others are not, because religious language is supposed to be so comprehensive that it should shape the perception and experience of other human experience.

評論：若沒有清楚區分，林貝克的神學稱得上為一個新學派的開端嗎？

Maybe Lindbeck's original proposal is much more humble. He simply would like to argue that too many theologians doing their theologies in a way that is, metaphorically speaking, not close to the text of the bible and he gives a call back to the bible. "It is easy to see how theological descriptions of a religion may on this view need to be materially diverse even when the formal criterion of faithfulness remains the same. The primary focus is not on God's being in itself, for that is not what the text is about, but on how life is to be lived and reality construed in the light of God's character as an agent as this is depicted in the stories of Israel and of Jesus"(p. 121). If so, I don't think it deserve to be called a distinct theory of theology. It's just an internal correcting call among theologians with similar vision and attitudes regarding what theology is about (based on the bible more, to understand the world with our biblical faith, etc.)

評論：文化語意進路下的後自由神學（林貝克說的那種），是否真的比別的模式優越？已不是第一次，當我們看到林貝克說他的建議如何優於其他進路，原來那個理由並不是如此明顯地可接受的。

Look at the three benefits of an intratextual view of theology on pp. 122-123. First, a postliberal theology does not care much about historicity but the character of God in the history-like narrative. But it seems that the so-called experiential-expressive or cultural-linguistic approaches could also accommodate this view. (Some of them are stuck in historicity debate but it is not a necessary feature of those two 'approaches'.)

The second advantage of postliberal theology over the others two suggested by Lindbeck looks very similar to the first one. By judging that the literary genre of John is not that of veridical history, he simply takes John's message as communal confession rather than a true self-description made by Jesus. Then, how is this different from the experiential-expressive (i.e., liberal) approach of taking many "historical" accounts as meaning something else? The only difference seems to be that, regarding those "something else" meant by those quasi-historical accounts, Lindbeck charges that liberal people think of something too remote from the biblical text but he does not. Yet 'remoteness' is hard to define.

His third point is that cultural-linguistic approach does not get stuck on typological or figurative purposes (p. 123) and cultural-linguistic approach can still allow for "analogical extension" that lets us think about whether the Holocaust have to do with Mt. Sinai. In this way, he claims that cultural-linguistic approach can incorporate "the postbibilcal worlds into the world of the Bible in much the same fashion as did the tradition" P. 123). However, there are two questions here. First, as he admits, it is analogical extension and imagination that makes cultural-linguistic approach capable of incorporating the postbiblical world into the world of the Bible. What's so interesting about cultural-linguistic approach then? People can imagine and make analogical extension about almost everything to everything. Second, figurative speech is part of the biblical language. Why should a theory that claims to be faithful to the text ignores figurative studies and denounces them as outdated or wrongheaded? Do you know what analogical extension you and I have?

評論：林貝克建議的神學在甚麼意義下與神學自由主義有分別？

In his concluding remarks of this section, Lindbeck says that the bible is a "foreign text" (p. 124) to the contemporary America such that liberal theology is usually dominant because liberal theology translates the religion into popular categories. But I don't see Lindbeck own proposal fares any better. He stresses many times that his view can ignore the historicity of the biblical account. This shows that he is using the modern categories of historicity and trustworthiness due to history to talk about the bible. And those are concepts foreign or extratextual to the bible.

All in all, it is not clear how Lindbeck own theory is obviously distinct from liberal theology. The claim to be more faithful to the bible sounds presumptuous. Also, it is not clear how capable such a postliberal theology is regarding influencing the contemporary world which is so far away from the biblical world. This is especially so when we compare such ability of liberal theology. I'd rather see Lindbeck admits this and then take up a more traditional look than to unconvincingly claim to have shown similar capability to connect with the contemporary world.

[Ming Yuen Yee]

So, now he has given us three theories about religion, three theories about doctrines and three theories about theology. This is theoretical possible that he could do three things in one shot. However, the substance of worry is that Lindbeck apparently making identity claim, i.e., the x theory of A is just the x theory of B. (x: cultural-lingustic, experiential-expressive, cognitive-propositional. A, B, C: religion, doctrine, theology). If he is implicitly making this identity claim, he is begging the question. He does not have to show how useful his cultural-linguistic approach is useful to theology because , to him, its usefulness on religion and doctrine has long been proven. If now they are all the same, then its usefulness on theology can automatically be taken as proven as well.

In other words, it could be challenged what exactly is the cultural-linguistic theory of theology that is distinct from a cultural-linguistic theory of religion and a cultural-linguistic theory of doctrines. Without such clarification, the whole chapter 6 doesn't make much sense.


I have never thought about it this way. But now that you have raised it, I would say, Lindbeck never thinks through the ontological differences between religion, doctrine and theology -- an issue I flagged up from the beginning. He does not quite know how to insert theology into his conceptual universe already populated by religion (as interpretive framework) and doctrine (as second-order = normative).

Lindbeck apparently starts off the book with only religion and doctrine in mind, putting on a social-scientific hat. Then at the final chapter, he resumes his real theologian persona and almost puts forward as a "value-added" a very global view of what theology should be. Such a grand claim of course cannot be established so easily. When he says (p.112) his theory will finally prove unacceptable if it cannot be used to understand theology, it is an "over-kill" in selling his theory. His theory may (or may not) help people to understand what theology is or can be, but it is far from showing what theology should be.

But for Lindbeck himself he may be quite satisfied that his goal is well achieved. His theory seems to give an account of what the activity of theologising is -- even though it is only his way of doing post-liberal theology. At least his theory is self-exemplifying -- most people would not agree with this point because Lindbeck in this book makes use of so much of social scientific and philosophical stuff, but this is a common misunderstanding of what "intra-textual" theology (which does not exclude ad hoc apologetics) means in practice.

As for what "post-liberal theology" actually is and why it is so great, e.g. how to characterise intra-textuality, this book is quite useless. Unless we read on, we cannot fairly discuss it.

[Daniel_Cheung]

I have never thought about it this way. But now that you have raised it, I would say, Lindbeck never thinks through the ontological differences between religion, doctrine and theology -- an issue I flagged up from the beginning. He does not quite know how to insert theology into his conceptual universe already fully occupied by religion (as interpretive framework) and doctrine (as second-order = normative).

Lindbeck apparently starts off the book with only religion and doctrine in mind, putting on a social-scientific hat. Then at the final chapter, he resumes his real theologian persona and almost puts forward as a "value-added" a very global view of what theology should be. Such a grand claim of course cannot be established so easily. When he says (p.112) his theory will finally prove unacceptable if it cannot be used to understand theology it is an "over-kill" in selling his theory. His theory may (or may not) help people to understand what theology is or can be, but it is far from showing what theology should be.

But for Lindbeck himself he may be quite satisfied that his goal is well achieved. His theory seems to give an account of what the activity of theologising is -- even though it is only his way of doing post-liberal theology. At least his theory is self-exemplifying -- most people would not agree with this point because Lindbeck in this book makes use of so-much social scientific and philosophical stuff, but that is a common misunderstanding of what "intra-textual" theology (which does not exclude ad hoc apologetics) means in practice.

As for what "post-liberal theology" actually is and why it is so great, e.g. how to characterise intra-textuality, this book is quite useless. Unless we read on, we cannot fairly discuss it.

1. Thinking of this point again, I'd like to remind readers that in an earlier chapter (maybe ch. 1), Lindbeck emphatically claims that we must not confuse dogmatic with theology. And there he seems to look down upon those who are confused this way. It is really ironic that now he is taking the two to be the same without a second thought.

2. Yes, while I am criticizing Lindbeck, I still think that there could be some forms of postliberal theology that makes a lot of sense and are powerful in shaping theology and/or church mentality nowadays. It's just too bad that the starting "classic" of such a school of thought turns out to be so poor in arguments and exposition.

[Daniel_Cheung]

在最後這兩節，林貝克嘗試分析後自由神學的前景。在第三節，他欲指證後自由神學的 applicability 和 faithfulness。他區分聖經中的預言和科學預測不同，後者說的事若沒發生，那理論就被證偽，但前者卻沒有這回事，就如約拿預言尼尼微城會覆亡，但卻沒發生，而尼尼微城人悔改。因此，說主必快來，用意不在於做預測，而是用這宣講塑造人們今天應有的行為和思想。因此，一個神學的建議，只要 faithful and applicable to the degree that it appears practical in terms of an eschatologically and empirically defensible scenario of what is to come (p. 125)，就是一個好的神學建議。

那英文句子點出他這幾頁裡的重要，然而，讀者不難發現這裡有一個自打咀巴的地方：既然不是像預測那般可被經驗否證，林貝克還憑甚麼說神學是 empirical defensibility ？還有，為何要按終末觀塑造到一個現時的生活形態，才算是 faithful and applicable ？不難發現，這裡他已為自己的後自由神學餔路，因為在接續的篇幅，他認為後自由神學的最大優點是構成一個信仰群體的生活形態，人們在其中可以用聖經文本的世界來看外邊的世界。

那麼，自由神學的建議如何？林貝克指自由神學由經驗開始，加上一個對現世的解釋，繼而調較他們對神國的 vision 。但他認為後自由神學的步驟卻是相反的。怎樣相反？When ...one looks at the present in the light of an intratextually derived eschatology, one gets a different view of which contemporary developments are likely to be ultimately significant. Similar practical recommendations may at times be advances, but for dissimilar theological reasons. A postliberal might argue, for example, that traditional sexual norms should be revised because the situation has changed from when they were formulated or because they are not intratextually faithful - but not, as some liberals may be inclined to argue, on the grounds that sexual liberation is an advance toward the eschatological future. (pp. 125-126)

這講法的問題是，我們很難判定自由神學必然要把性解性視作邁向終末。這裡是林貝克對他心目中的自由神學骨子裡的動機作出揣測，一旦揣測錯誤，林貝克口中的後自由神學與自由神學的區別就不再明顯了。誠然，正如我在評論之前幾章時提過，究竟林貝克提出的方法有多獨特，是要受到質疑的。又以 Tracy 為例，在林貝克眼中，此君是自由神學的主將，但我看 Tracy 的著作，卻不覺得他明顯地以經驗為先（其實「經驗為先」這講法本身已充滿歧義，之前講過，不贅），更不似是忽視了 intratextuality 。我不得不懷疑，林貝克藉著醜化別人來抬高自己建議的獨特性。

接著，林貝克承認後自由神學在今天的世代是好像欠缺時代相關性的。因為經驗－表達模式是大部份非神學學科的主流進路。在這意義下，他承認後自由神學是遜色的。然而，他質疑這樣走下去有甚麼成果。It is at least an open question whether any religion will have the requisite toughness for this demanding task unless it at some point makes the claim that it is significantly different and unsurpassably true; and it is easier for a religion to advance this claim if it is interpreted in cultural-linguistic rather than experiential-expressive terms. (p. 127)接著，他強調基督教如何在歷史裡塑造了西方文化傳統，無可替代，因此， it is likely to contribute more to the future of humanity if it preserves its own distinctiveness and integrity than if it yields to the homogenizing tendencies associated with liberal experiential-expressivism... This conclusion is paradoxical. Religious communities are likely to be practically relevant in the long run to the degree that they do not first ask what is either practical or relevant, but instead concentrate on their own intratextual outlooks and forms of life. (p. 128)

林貝克這調論的問題是，他所指的基督教的 unsurpassable truth ，按之前第三章的講法，只不過是在一套語言裡有無上地位，因為他否認人可以認知一些paradigm-neutral 的真理，他就只能說這麼多。這是否足夠讓宗教在今天生存？另外，在我於學界的膚淺見聞裡，基督教已越來越邊緣化，以哲學為例，若非基督教大學，人們絕少能讀到一些宗教哲學（不是指認識和支持某種立場，而是連討論那些話題的機會也不多），自然科學和科技的發展亦已完全擺脫宗教的影子。我倒沒有林貝克的信心，以為一個堅持其獨特性的基督教仍然可以在未來（且談六十年），仍然能 contribute more to the future of humanity 。當然，何謂基督教之獨特，在這裡也是要討論的。剛才見到，原來林貝克眼中的基督教之獨特可以不包括一些 sexual moral norms 的。這與一般人說的傳統基督教的獨特性，並不相同。可能林貝克說的獨特的基督教，只是一個無法擺脫聖經文本敘事的語言，只要能熟練地玩弄那語言，to the extent that you can get rid of those sexual moral norms ，仍未算是失卻了基督教在 sexual morality方面的獨特要求。如此，我不知道他想說基督教要保持的獨特性是甚麼。他這裡的論述，假設了後自由神學必然比自由神學更保存到基督教的獨特性，但他又拒絕命題－認知進路下對基督教獨特性的傳統式理解，令我感到那似是他的dogmatic 理解和判斷，和一種文字遊戲。

[Daniel_Cheung]

在第四節，林貝克嘗試把基督教的 intelligibility 視作對基督教語言／paradigm 的熟練－－那節的英文題目是 Intelligibility as Skill。他要處理的困難的，他的建議似乎會墮入一種相對主義，就是說，不同宗教有不同文本，各宗教只能按自己的經典來看世界，這變成 self-enclosed and incommensurable intellectual ghettoes，而各宗教之間的選擇，只會是一種blind faith。

林貝克的回應有兩部份。一，他認為宗教如同語言裡是包羅萬有的，所以宗教只能像語言般被學習，而不能被證明或否證。但這如何回應 intellectual ghettoes 的問題呢？林貝克說，這是因為很多學科已經開始用文化－語意進路來理解宗教，Scholarly nontheologians who want to understand religion are concerned with how religions work for their adherents, not with their credibility. Their interest, one might say, is in descriptive rather than apologetic intelligibility. The result, paradoxically, is that a postliberal approach, with its commitment to intratextual description, may well have interdisciplinary advantages, while liberal theology, with its apologetic focus on making religion more widely credible, seems increasingly to be a nineteenth-century enclave in a twentieth-century milieu. (p. 130) 所以基督教多強調後自由神學，並不會使之成為 intellectual ghetto。

原來，如果有一天，學界已不再承認宗教有甚麼真理宣稱可言，但由於世界上還存在宗教群體，所以只好把宗教放入社會科學裡做研究，即不問對錯好壞，只研究世界上有一群人有一些古怪思想，基督教若要在這近乎完全否定宗教的氛圍下取回一些intellectual respectability ，就是把自己的神學也變成descriptive 的社會科學論述分析。再者，假如到了二十世紀中葉時，學界連這個社會科學式的宗教研究也拼棄，因為覺得宗教是多餘的，就像巫術，不值得花時間研究，那麼，堅持用社會科學進路的後自由神學是否突然會變成 intellectual ghetto, a 2000s enclave in a 2050s milieu（抑或，醒覺原來自己由始至終都活在ghetto，只是1984年時有個叫做林貝克的夜郎寫書說他們不是活在 ghetto）？Intellectual respectability 不是由某種進路是否在今天學術流行來決定的，而是由那個思想的理由和結構、加上當代的思潮眼光來決定的。（這句話形構得不太好，但讀者應該明白到我要指出的分別。正如愛恩斯坦的理論的intellectual respectability 不是用別的學科愛流行用甚麼進路去理解來決定的。）

另外，其實林貝克這個第一點的回應，是在取消 intelligibility 的意思，堅持 intellectual ghetto 不是問題，而不是真的在說，後自由神學令基督教有 intelligibility。那麼，要看下一點了。

林貝克運用Kuhn的理論，指出不用科學範式下，人們仍可以有理性，但那理性只能用那範式裡的標準來界定（按：即如在牛頓物理學時代，人們以理解、研究、討論牛頓物理學對世界的詮釋，作為他們的intellectual activities ，那裡可以有一同的norms 指出怎樣才是理性，從這意義看，那就是以人對一個paradigm 的熟練作為人有多理性的判準）。如此，我們不用追求 inter-paradigm 的理性或基礎（foundation），只用追求 intra-paradigm 的理性。In this perspective, the reasonableness of a religion is largely a function of its assimilative powers, of its ability to provide an intelligible interpretation in its own terms of the varied situations and realities adherents encounter. (p. 131)

這個回答，我認為是可接受的。但究竟 Kuhnian paradigms 之間有沒有理性的判斷，在Kuhn studies 裡是很複雜的問題，林貝克不單沒有理會這可能性，甚至已隻字不提了。

有趣的是，林貝克的社會科學熱誠又冒出來了。本來，正如上段說，他已回答了他設下的問題，但到了最後三段，他卻談了別的話題－－他說，有越來越多人聲稱自己十分敬虔，即使他們不返教會，也不相信甚麼死後復活的事，甚至不相信有上帝這一位創造者。返不返教會，這仍可算是次要，sexual morality 的norms 可以更改，也是有可能的，但一個不相信死後復活和不相信上帝創造世界的人，還可以稱得上為基督徒嗎？即使可以，後自由神學可以容許嗎？若可以，林貝克聲稱後自由神學堅持基督教的獨特性，就像是自打咀巴了。當然，他大概會反駁說，為甚麼一定要相信這些？你只不過是用了命題進路來看基督教，在我的文化進路裡，這完全沒問題。好的，假如他真的這樣回答，我想，我們至少要認定，林貝克經常聲稱他的新建議保存著基督教傳統特色，其實只是 lip service，那些甚麼 faithful to the text, intratextuality ，原來可以連聖經文本裡強調的死後復活和上帝創世都可以詮釋掉的。在這意義下，他跟自由神學沒有甚麼分別，分別只在於，他硬要把自由神學說成經驗為先（一個充滿歧義的含糊指控）。

全章和全書的七段總結，沒有甚麼特別再說，林貝克重申，後自由神學支持者甘於在當代社會裡建立基督教群體，不理會甚麼 intellectual respectability 的問題，對他們來說， intratrextuality 才是最重要的。他又重申， The ultimate test in this as in other areas is performance. If a postliberal approach in its actual employment proves to be conceptually powerful and practiacly useful to the relevant communities, it will in time become standard. (p. 134)在最後一段，他寄望將來： It remains an open question, however, whether the intratextual path will be pursued. There is much talk at present about typological, figurative, and narrative theology, but little actual performance. Only in some younger theologians does one see the beginnings of a desire to renew in a posttraditional and postliberal mode the ancient practice of absorbing the universe into the biblical world. May their tribe increase. (p. 135)

[Daniel_Cheung]

讀畢全書，讓我寫少許整體的評議。林貝克的建議是，「真」這概念不用是一種永恆的、放諸四海皆準的真，所以拒絕一種他稱為命題進路的真理觀；同時，他認為「真」是相對於語言和範式的，所以我們研究宗教或建構神學時，不用追求一種前語言的普遍宗教經驗。如此，他建議我們用一個語意－文化進路來看宗教、教義及神學。他聲稱，這建議的優點是既可承認各宗派／宗教的真理宣稱，讓它們擁有 unsurpassable truth 的崇高地位，又可以容許不同宗派／宗教有不同和不相容的真理。另一優點是，由於在很多不同的當代學科裡（主要指社會科學），人們研究宗教時都採用語意－文化進路，所以這進路會在當代有一定的 intelligibility 。他承認經驗－表達進路仍暫時會佔主流地位，但他認為遲早人們會因為對現代性那種追求永恆知識基礎foundation失去信心，轉向後自由神學，並且，後自由神學強調的思想與群體之關係，在今時的社會結構裡（社會由多個不同信念和文化的群體組成），是很吻合的。

我有以下幾個批評：

一，他在理論上其實並未成功指出，如何可以弄一種「真」，既是在不同群體的自我觀點下屬於 unsurpassable truth ，但在跨群體間卻可以互不兼容。他嘗試把教義從基督教思想裡挑出來，給它們一個很特殊的 higher-order的地位，就是作為宗教語言的語法規則。然而，在他舉出的眾多實際例子裡，教義究竟是怎樣的一種無真假意義的語法則；我們亦無法看出究竟甚麼是教義，甚麼不是教義；還有，他運用這理論解決教義衝突或教義興衰時，所講的教義若不是純歷史偶然產品（我不是暗指一定要有啟示這本體分別，而是他很少理會人們究竟為甚麼覺得那些是教義），就是可過去之教義背後的更基本原則／精神。他曾提及speech-act theory ，那是我看到最像樣可以建構一些東西出來的（只是看來如此，我無意說我認為那裡最終會有出路），但究竟怎樣與speech-act theory結合，他就不談了。

二，且不談理論，回看現實。他的理論真的能促進宗派／宗教間的對話嗎？那倒像是他自以為有對話，然後告訴別人說他成功了。最後，人們都會問：「究竟你講的對話是甚麼意思？會帶來甚麼後果？如果我們只是更了解別人有甚麼教義，他們的教義對他們的信仰生活有多重要，然後甚麼都不用再判別了，我們算是在對話嗎？」

三，他把別的神學強行分類為命題進路和經驗進路，並不恰當。首先，原來他的語意進路也會關心命題的，那究竟他反對命題進路的甚麼？在那些相關討論裡，作為一個研究哲學的人，我覺得他對命題是甚麼和所謂命題主義的缺點在哪裡，其實並未有足夠的掌握。後來他說，文化進路跟某種修正了的命題進路其實很接近。我倒認為，所謂命題認知進路，若不是被他定義得那麼狹隘，本來就是容許了這樣的可能，他故作矯扭而已。另外，他批評經驗進路，說那是以經驗為先，是帶有歧義的。他有時把批評重點放在人類沒有普遍相同／相似的前語言的宗教經驗，但我指出，同一上帝可以有不同的顯現方式，於是人就可以有不同類型的宗教經驗。我認為，其實他最想說的，不是否定普遍宗教經驗，而是否定人可以在語言以外認定某兩個經驗是相同的，因為他們需要用語言來描述。然而，如果是這樣，他的建議跟John Hick 的宗教多元論等經驗表達進路有何分別？所謂經驗表達進路，若不是被他定義得那麼狹隘，本來就是容許了這樣的可能。那麼，他的文化語意進路有多少獨特性可言？

四，在林貝克的思想裡，似乎沒有資源指出甚麼是基督教，甚麼分支已不能再稱為基督教（更遑論異端）。在書裡可以找到的最重要的兩個指標，一是歷史延續性（即這群體是一代又一代的發展下去，而不是突然出現），一是願意與一代又一代地發展的那個群體保持溝通。但這似乎是太弱的標準，而且妄顧了宗派判斷裡的規範性，以實然取替應然。還有的是，神學和教義，在教會歷史裡的一個重要功用是指明何謂正統、何謂異端。雖然未必很成功，但其歷史意義卻不容輕視。如今，林貝克的教義觀和神學觀在這方面是完全空白的。

五，林貝克常誇口說他的進路很合學術潮流，因為越來越多人用語意文化的角度理解宗教群體與其宗教思想的關係。這裡其實主要是指社會科學或文化研究（和少許相關哲學討論）。然而，問題是，宗教或哲理強調一種合理性，是社科學或文化研究所不理會的。即使是一群瘋子，他們的某些社群現象，學者仍可以用社會科學或文化研究角度去了解的。這有甚麼值得可誇？人家把宗教的具體想法和立場架空，早就當是一班笨蛋相信的古怪古老思想，於是宗教研究才只剩下關心這類宗教群體社群現象。林貝克竟然認為，人家愛用這角度研究宗教，所以他也要把基督教神學的方向改為只關心這些，視之為一種成就。

六，我相信很多讀神學的朋友會比我更同情林貝克，甚至喜歡林貝克。但我覺得那似乎只是因為林貝克指出了當代神學一些困境，就是在別的學科裡沒有地位，宗派林立以致連信徒也覺得教義是多餘的，並且很多教義看來太古舊，要放棄。當然，最吸引的是，林貝克把他的理論撘上了某些被稱為後現代的思想，反對知識論上的基礎，在社會實踐裡只須強調自己的 tribe/ghetto ，這無論在學界裡、教會在社會裡的定位、或實際個人生活上，都是頗吸引和方便的，既新潮又現實。然而，若換著是一個神學圈外的人，看到原來今天的基督教神學界弄了這樣一種思想出來，把教義貶為一堆某種古怪宗教群體的思想基礎，不準問好歹或合理與否，總之那群體存在的事實是不容否認的......他大概不會覺得是甚麼一回事。再者，林貝克對其他思想（包括那些對他理論建構極其重要的思想，如命題的形而上學、文化理論、speech-act theory、科學哲學和知識論裡的Kuhn 等）掌握和討論之粗疏，甚至會叫外人感到是堆砌，連班門弄斧也未必談得上。

[Daniel_Cheung]

這書很可能是神學院課程參考閱讀之一，而本區的討論包含不少神學以外的學術角度，甚有參考價值。若有朋友要用這裡任何人士提出的觀點，敬請尊重知識產權，在引用時列明出處，至少要包括：...基督教人文學會，「林貝克：《教義的本質》閱讀小組, www.s-h-c.org... 。另請留意，本區的討論以對談形式為主，沒有很嚴謹的論文寫作，引用時敬請小心不要斷章取義。謝謝！