如何把神學和信仰定位？

[mckung]

我在思想一個問題﹕神學是能深化對信仰的認識和理解，但是在神面前，究竟它應有多大的價值呢？應如何去定位？

我在想，是否因為我喜歡思考而思考呢？抑或它有一個十分大的意義，當我在天國見到神時，能夠有一點東西放在天上？

我想神未必會計計我們有多少學位而賞賜我們？(haha):)

[clement]

我在思想一個問題﹕神學是能深化對信仰的認識和理解，但是在神面前，究竟它應有多大的價值呢？應如何去定位？

我在想，是否因為我喜歡思考而思考呢？抑或它有一個十分大的意義，當我在天國見到神時，能夠有一點東西放在天上？

我想神未必會計計我們有多少學位而賞賜我們？(haha):)


我想，對於神學（theology）來說，重要的是建立一種神學思想活動（theologising），建立一種神學思維（theological thinking），換言之，把種種問題視為屬於自己的問題，而非漠不關心的純粹知性的問題。例如，關於普救論、預定論的問題，除了找尋知識上的答案外，重要的是如何從這些問題和答案中找到安身立命、待人接物應有的態度。我不是想提出一種約化論，認為只有給出「實踐意義」的，才有價值；但畢竟這樣來構想神學，比較容易說明神學本身的「意義」和「價值」。

要做到這一點，即把問題視為自己的，則需要把自己也放入問題中、使自己牽涉在問題中。

而且，問題最好是從具體生活情景中產生的，這樣才不致被他人指責說，這些問題「跟信仰生命毫不相關」。例如，關於普救論、預定論的問題，可以產生於「自己生命的終極結局」問題上，更加可以產生於「自己親朋之生命的終極結局」上。如果有未信家人或者朋友得重病，問題就顯得迫切得多：我到底應該把握之間傳福音，還是進行「臨終關顧」就可以？

[Ming Yuen Yee]

我想，對於神學（theology）來說，重要的是建立一種神學思想活動（theologising），建立一種神學思維（theological thinking），換言之，把種種問題視為屬於自己的問題，而非漠不關心的純粹知性的問題。例如，關於普救論、預定論的問題，除了找尋知識上的答案外，重要的是如何從這些問題和答案中找到安身立命、待人接物應有的態度。我不是想提出一種約化論，認為只有給出「實踐意義」的，才有價值；但畢竟這樣來構想神學，比較容易說明神學本身的「意義」和「價值」。

要做到這一點，即把問題視為自己的，則需要把自己也放入問題中、使自己牽涉在問題中。

而且，問題最好是從具體生活情景中產生的，這樣才不致被他人指責說，這些問題「跟信仰生命毫不相關」。例如，關於普救論、預定論的問題，可以產生於「自己生命的終極結局」問題上，更加可以產生於「自己親朋之生命的終極結局」上。如果有未信家人或者朋友得重病，問題就顯得迫切得多：我到底應該把握之間傳福音，還是進行「臨終關顧」就可以？

I totally agree. "Thinking theologically" is a better idiom than "doing theology"* -- where the latter seems to be about doctrines and the right/true/correct doctrines.

But isn’t this ideal ("to put the thinker back into her thinking") also something promoted and practised by, say, Existentialists and Neo-Confucians, among others? If so, how “theological” is theological thinking then? Is God (or the Bible) a necessary element in theological thinking, why and how? What I what to propose is not that we should try to distinguish theological thinking from other kinds of thinking – but the other way round, namely to explore the possibility that to think theologically is simply to think (to wit, this is what thinking ought to be, or even what humankind's Being should be).

* Don't want to give you the feminist crap -- but I always have problems with the verb "do" which has some connotations of "violence" to my ears. You can feel it if you listen to, say, white male philosophy PhD students talking about how they do philosophy. Remember Sophia was a femine goddess. What would she think about how you do (to) her?:p

[維記wei_kei]

我在思想一個問題﹕神學是能深化對信仰的認識和理解，但是在神面前，究竟它應有多大的價值呢？應如何去定位？

我在想，是否因為我喜歡思考而思考呢？抑或它有一個十分大的意義，當我在天國見到神時，能夠有一點東西放在天上？

我想神未必會計計我們有多少學位而賞賜我們？(haha):)
個人認為，這個問題frame得不太好，至少我覺得問題中有很多不經意的預設：如神學對於神聖或救恩方面有沒有用／價值，就隱隱然限定了討論的範圍，甚至是預設了未必合用的批準了。當然，也如clement所說，這樣看神學的方式，也好像是在聚焦在其結果（doctrine），過於是其過程（theologizing）。

[zhengzi]

* Don't want to give you the feminist crap -- but I always have problems with the verb "do" which has some connotations of "violence" to my ears. You can feel it if you listen to, say, white male philosophy PhD students talking about how they do philosophy. Remember Sophia was a femine goddess. What would she think about how you do (to) her?:p
離題一下，對於中文的「搞」您又覺得怎樣？內地的中文很愛搞：搞衛生、搞哲學、搞政治、搞生產、搞宋詞。

[Ming Yuen Yee]

離題一下，對於中文的「搞」您又覺得怎樣？內地的中文很愛搞：搞衛生、搞哲學、搞政治、搞生產、搞宋詞。

Yes, you are right. "搞" may sound "bad" to some of our ears, but may be perfectly acceptable in another socio-linguistic context. I would defer to your expertise on this.

Having said that, even if a certain usage of an idiom is "acceptable" by a society, we still have to ask: Acceptable to whom? According to whose standards? What does the idiom conceal and reveal? Right?

[clement]

I totally agree. "Thinking theologically" is a better idiom than "doing theology"* -- where the latter seems to be about doctrines and the right/true/correct doctrines.

But isn’t this ideal ("to put the thinker back into her thinking") also something promoted and practised by, say, Existentialists and Neo-Confucians, among others? If so, how “theological” is theological thinking then? Is God (or the Bible) a necessary element in theological thinking, why and how? What I what to propose is not that we should try to distinguish theological thinking from other kinds of thinking – but the other way round, namely to explore the possibility that to think theologically is simply to think (to wit, this is what thinking ought to be, or even what humankind's Being should be).


I do not fully agree with the equation of "theological thinking" (in its stricter, specifically Christian sense) with "existential thinking", although I would agree that a modern theological thinking should include a humanistic, existential understanding of man.

Even an "existential" theologian like R. Bultmann won't say such things. At most, Bultmann would says "theological thinking" and "anthropological thinking" are two sides of the same coin or mutually presupposing each other. To understand man (fully), one must understand God, and vice versa. My position is nearer to Bultmann's than yours.

[zhengzi]

Yes, you are right. "搞" may sound "bad" to some of our ears, but may be perfectly acceptable in another socio-linguistic context. I would defer to your expertise on this.

Having said that, even if a certain usage of an idiom is "acceptable" by a society, we still have to ask: Acceptable to whom? According to whose standards? What does the idiom conceal and reveal? Right?

I didn't intend to touch the question about whether certain usage of "do" in English or "搞" in Chinese is acceptable or not. I was just thinking what makes one feel that certain usage with the verb "do" has connotations of "violence". Is it because of the linguistic item itself, or something beyond language?

Various languages have this kind of "omnipotent verb" like "do" in English that can collocate with different sorts of actions and objects, e.g. 搞 in Chinese and する in Japanese, where many of them were orginated from verbs about concret actions, but later their meanings expanded to those abstract ones (like doing philosophy, 搞政治) [N.B. this is a very common phenomenon that the meaning of a word develops from concret to abstract things]. I wonder if it is their origins from concret actions that make one feel violence when they are used with abstract matters like philosophy, etc?

To check on this hypothesis, I would like to confirm if you, being proficient in both English and Chinese, feel connotations of "violence" about the usage of 搞 for abstract things as well? If the answer is yes, then my hypothesis seems to hold (and I may write a paper on this in the future :haha: ); if the answer is no, then I guess it may not be related to the linguistic item itself, but something beyond language (e.g. it is utterred by a white male, how people "do" with philosophy, etc).

[胖嘟嘟]

I didn't intend to touch the question about whether certain usage of "do" in English or "搞" in Chinese is acceptable or not. I was just thinking what makes one feel that certain usage with the verb "do" has connotations of "violence". Is it because of the linguistic item itself, or something beyond language?

Various languages have this kind of "omnipotent verb" like "do" in English that can collocate with different sorts of actions and objects, e.g. 搞 in Chinese and する in Japanese, where many of them were orginated from verbs about concret actions, but later their meanings expanded to those abstract ones (like doing philosophy, 搞政治) [N.B. this is a very common phenomenon that the meaning of a word develops from concret to abstract things]. I wonder if it is their origins from concret actions that make one feel violence when they are used with abstract matters like philosophy, etc?

To check on this hypothesis, I would like to confirm if you, being proficient in both English and Chinese, feel connotations of "violence" about the usage of 搞 for abstract things as well? If the answer is yes, then my hypothesis seems to hold (and I may write a paper on this in the future :haha: ); if the answer is no, then I guess it may not be related to the linguistic item itself, but something beyond language (e.g. it is utterred by a white male, how people "do" with philosophy, etc).

我想可能是明姊妹把 'do' 聯想到 '幹' 。 那個在中文字上，是可以有很暴力，尤其是性暴力的意味吧。

[但以理．古]

I didn't intend to touch the question about whether certain usage of "do" in English or "搞" in Chinese is acceptable or not. I was just thinking what makes one feel that certain usage with the verb "do" has connotations of "violence". Is it because of the linguistic item itself, or something beyond language?



我想問題不只是搞或做的泛音，也不一定要去到粗暴（如果可以區分粗暴不粗暴）的幹呀、操呀，始終沒有人講操你個哲學，或者幹掉存在主義．．不如想想，查實做哲學和做愛，對男人來說在態度上有甚麼相似吧。

[但以理．古]

我在思想一個問題﹕神學是能深化對信仰的認識和理解，但是在神面前，究竟它應有多大的價值呢？應如何去定位？

我在想，是否因為我喜歡思考而思考呢？抑或它有一個十分大的意義，當我在天國見到神時，能夠有一點東西放在天上？

我想神未必會計計我們有多少學位而賞賜我們？(haha):)

我個人會認為有些神學形式真是沒有甚麼作用的，而且真的有一些思考形式是很風花說月的，但正如所謂好有意義的為主作工，我又不見得樣樣聖工都是那麼得神賞賜。

但我會覺得，一個有腦又熱愛信仰的人，很自然他會欲求思考信仰更多，神學就這樣產生了，至於教義形成或正道辨邪，那是後話。

[clement]

我想問題不只是搞或做的泛音，也不一定要去到粗暴（如果可以區分粗暴不粗暴）的幹呀、操呀，始終沒有人講操你個哲學，或者幹掉存在主義．．不如想想，查實做哲學和做愛，對男人來說在態度上有甚麼相似吧。

有些男人，應該是抱著 do "it", finish "it" 的心態去做。

不過，我突然想到，尼采說，真理是女人。

Supposing truth is a woman - what then? Are there not grounds for the suspicion that all philosophers, insofar as they were dogmatists, have been very inexpert about women? that the gruesome seriousness, the clumsy obtrusiveness with which they have usually approached truth so far have been awkward and very improper methods for winning a woman's heart? What is certain is that she has not allowed herself to be won: - and today every kind of dogmatism is left standing dispirited and discouraged.
— Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Preface'

[clement]

我個人會認為有些神學形式真是沒有甚麼作用的，而且真的有一些思考形式是很風花說月的，但正如所謂好有意義的為主作工，我又不見得樣樣聖工都是那麼得神賞賜。

但我會覺得，一個有腦又熱愛信仰的人，很自然他會欲求思考信仰更多，神學就這樣產生了，至於教義形成或正道辨邪，那是後話。


教義形成或正道辨邪，並非後話呢！這是跟神學的產生以及發展休戚相關，關係莫大！

如果根據你第一段的結論，或許首先應該丟掉無用的三一論，以及神人二性這些純粹的智性思辨。不過，當然，既然正統建築在三一論和神人二性上，就算怎樣「無用」，也是非常有用的，無論如何也要keep住，無論如何反對理性思辨，總得把這些「無用的」智性思辨統統保留下來。

[Ming Yuen Yee]

To check on this hypothesis, I would like to confirm if you, being proficient in both English and Chinese, feel connotations of "violence" about the usage of 搞 for abstract things as well? If the answer is yes, then my hypothesis seems to hold (and I may write a paper on this in the future :haha: ); if the answer is no, then I guess it may not be related to the linguistic item itself, but something beyond language (e.g. it is utterred by a white male, how people "do" with philosophy, etc).

Interesting. I would look forward to your paper.:D It seems to me that it is the manner in which the young (usually sexually deprived) white male PhD students utter the word that makes me feel the (sexual) violence. The context is all the more important, esp if you have some first hand experience of the sexual dynamics of the presence of a handful of female students among a male-dominated philosophy dept. As for the details of the courting, dating, mating, etc., I would better not openly discuss it here.

[Ming Yuen Yee]

Interesting. I would look forward to your paper.:D It seems to me that it is the manner in which the young (usually sexually deprived) white male PhD students utter the word that makes me feel the (sexual) violence. The context is all the more important, esp if you have some first hand experience of the sexual dynamics of the presence of a handful of female students among a male-dominated philosophy dept. As for the details of the courting, dating, mating, etc., I would better not openly discuss it here.

我自己離題了。還是轉移到《這麼近，又那麼遠—女性主義的神學反思》的thread繼續談這個敏感的話題好一點，我有些話想分享。

[clement]

I do not fully agree with the equation of "theological thinking" (in its stricter, specifically Christian sense) with "existential thinking", although I would agree that a modern theological thinking should include a humanistic, existential understanding of man.

Even an "existential" theologian like R. Bultmann won't say such things. At most, Bultmann would says "theological thinking" and "anthropological thinking" are two sides of the same coin or mutually presupposing each other. To understand man (fully), one must understand God, and vice versa. My position is nearer to Bultmann's than yours.


除了布爾特曼式的理解（要真正理解人就要真正理解上帝；要真正理解上帝就要真正理解人）外，當然還有巴特式的理解，強調信仰是與上帝相遇的事件。

此外，還有一種以教會為重心的理解，強調神學與信仰都要與教會生活相關連。也有一種《聖經》主義的基要主義理解，強調一切以《聖經》為唯一基礎。天主教的理解，例如拉納（K. Rahner）都比較接近布爾特曼。

[但以理．古]

教義形成或正道辨邪，並非後話呢！這是跟神學的產生以及發展休戚相關，關係莫大！

如果根據你第一段的結論，或許首先應該丟掉無用的三一論，以及神人二性這些純粹的智性思辨。不過，當然，既然正統建築在三一論和神人二性上，就算怎樣「無用」，也是非常有用的，無論如何也要keep住，無論如何反對理性思辨，總得把這些「無用的」智性思辨統統保留下來。

你是從教義史去看，但人家問題不是這個，我是從個人層次來回應。我倒不覺得三一論或人神二性論真的很沒有用，只是我們沒有好好切入時代問題去動用這些資源罷了，神學給關在博物館。我指的神學形式大概是一些鑑賞紅酒般的態度的討論，這種討論形式或精神樣態真是沒有也不覺可惜的。往往也是這種討論令人對神學反感。

[解画人]

我在思想一個問題﹕神學是能深化對信仰的認識和理解，但是在神面前，究竟它應有多大的價值呢？應如何去定位？

我在想，是否因為我喜歡思考而思考呢？抑或它有一個十分大的意義，當我在天國見到神時，能夠有一點東西放在天上？

我想神未必會計計我們有多少學位而賞賜我們？(haha):)

神学思考对我来说是一种灵修。
我要求我自己在思考神学时，向上帝发出问题；我把思考问题的对话变为是与上帝对话。
所以每次想通一个神学问题就是我与上帝更亲近的时刻，是我灵性增长的时候。
我一直避免“独自”的思考。我要求我的神学思考是一种灵修。这是我的做法。

[mckung]

那麼請問你會認為在神學思考時，是你的理性叫你得出一些結論，抑或是神很個別地跟你說話？
因我想靈修時，重要的是能跟神建立一個更密切的關係，多於頭腦上得著多一點理解。當然，理解神都可以是親近神的一種形式。^^

[tkhwong2005]

那麼請問你會認為在神學思考時，是你的理性叫你得出一些結論，抑或是神很個別地跟你說話？
因我想靈修時，重要的是能跟神建立一個更密切的關係，多於頭腦上得著多一點理解。當然，理解神都可以是親近神的一種形式。^^

I think it really depends your definition of "knowledge of God." I am sure that the knowledge involve with cognitive exercise in thinking about God. At the same time, your experiential knowledge of God also provide another way of knowing God.

In my mind, Prayer and theological thinking cannot seperate from one another. We prayer to know Him, so that we desire to know about Him; once we know about him, we draw closer to discover His unique personhood. The dialouge of theological thinking and spiritual meditaition should not be seperated.

[hh22]

我在思想一個問題﹕神學是能深化對信仰的認識和理解，但是在神面前，究竟它應有多大的價值呢？應如何去定位？

神學思考自然有它們的價值，如果以所謂「在神面前」來說，神學思考正可以讓我們知道那是個怎樣的神。

我想神未必會計計我們有多少學位而賞賜我們？(haha):)

個人的理解亦是如此！